Securing Monetary and Financial Stability: Why Canada Needs a Macroprudential Policy Framework

Abstract

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The Bank of Canada and Financial Stability: A New Mandate?,

“…To be fair, Basel III has yet to be tested. from others who have expressed similar sentiments (Laidler 2004, Crow 2012, Thiessen and Jenkins 2012, along with Jenkins and Longworth (2015). However, we have emphasized, among other issues, the risks for the central bank being too closely involved in implementing policies that potentially violate the monetary policy principle of "doing no harm."…”

Monetary policy and macroprudential policy: Different and separate?

“…In Canada, the financial regulatory framework is more complex and less coherent than in Sweden and the UK. Ragan () and Jenkins and Longworth () have stressed the need for a more coherent framework for financial stability and macroprudential policy, with improved transparency and accountability.…”

The European Systemic Risk Board – governance and early experience

“…For a more extensive overview of EU macroprudential policy, see, e.g., Acharya and Calomiris (2014). International comparisons of macroprudential governance are conducted in De Haan, Houben, and van der Molen (2012), Jenkins and Longworth (2015) and Edge and Liang (2019). For information on the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is in charge of identifying and monitoring systemic risks in the United States, see e.g.…”