2017
DOI: 10.1109/mvt.2017.2647814
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Securing Vehicular Controller Area Networks: An Approach to Active Bus-Level Countermeasures

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Cited by 22 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…• Spoofing Attack: Spoofing is the act of changing the appearance of a message or identification so that it pretends to come from a reliable, authentic source [10]. Spoofing attacks are further categorized into revolution per minute (RPM) and gear spoofing attack [24]. We have used the attack dataset from the CAR-Hacking dataset provided by Huy Kang Kim et al [1][25].…”
Section: B Can Attack Typesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• Spoofing Attack: Spoofing is the act of changing the appearance of a message or identification so that it pretends to come from a reliable, authentic source [10]. Spoofing attacks are further categorized into revolution per minute (RPM) and gear spoofing attack [24]. We have used the attack dataset from the CAR-Hacking dataset provided by Huy Kang Kim et al [1][25].…”
Section: B Can Attack Typesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The proposed solution combined with another module that injects errors on a CAN network would form an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), actively preventing the detected anomalies to be spread across the network. Such a module has already been proposed in solutions like CAN Stomping [Giannopoulos et al 2017] and error injection techniques [Freitas de Araujo-Filho 2018]. Regarding the classification made in Table 1, the solution proposed in this paper uses data from payload, a learned model and a single frame detection time lower than 1µs.…”
Section: Real-time Anomaly-based Ids For Canmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to prevent a frame from being correctly transmitted throughout the network, a possible solution is to introduce a bit stuffing error [Giannopoulos et al 2017] before the end of the frame. According to the CAN specification [Bosch 1991], a bit stuffing error occurs when six equal bits are received consecutively.…”
Section: The Time Constraintmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Since CAN is a multi-master broadcast bus protocol, the IDS may be deployed as a separate dedicated node on the CAN bus, implemented as either hardware (FPGA or ASIC) or integrated into one of the ECUs as a software application. Upon detecting intrusions/attacks, the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) may take immediate countermeasures, e.g., sending error frames to stop the current transmission [18]. In addition, a detailed log of the onboard security events may be sent to the Security Operations Center in the cloud, which performs in-depth post-attack analysis of the collected data both for single vehicles and the whole fleet, e.g., root cause analysis, impact analysis, for developing threat response strategies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%