Securitization, surveillance and ‘de-extremization’ in Xinjiang

Abstract

Previous explanations on China's counterterrorism strategy have highlighted the results of China's strategy of repression in Xinjiang, the historical antecedents and institutional foundations of its counterterrorism policies, as well as international and domestic sources of China's counterterrorism strategy. While acknowledging the importance of all these dimensions, this article draws attention to a largely neglected feature of China's counterterrorism strategy: the Chinese party-state's social engineering of Xinjiang. Building on Maoist-era practices such as the mass line and the ‘friend vs. enemy’ binary, the Communist party under Xi Jinping has integrated surveillance technologies as part of its strategy of preventive counterterrorism and ‘de-extremization’. This article argues that the Chinese party-state's embrace of modern technologies, a weak liberal tradition in China, Xi Jinping's rise to power in late 2012, and the appointment of Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang's party-secretary in 2016, provides the socio-political background for the intensification of securitization, surveillance and introduction of ‘re-education and training centres’ in Xinjiang. Surveillance technologies now complement collective, face-to-face methods of surveillance and Maoist-era techniques of mass mobilization, enabling the Chinese party-state to govern and manage the biopolitical spaces of Uyghurs with greater intensity, according to the state's precise norms. The legalization and institutionalization of ‘de-extremization’ has also led to the shift from mass ‘de-extremization’ propaganda to ‘drip-irrigation’ ideological and political re-education of individuals deemed at risk of extremism. The result is an increased capacity by the Chinese party-state to surveil and control the region, and to more effectively negate the possibility of individual resistance.

Political and Social Control in China: The Consolidation of Single-Party Rule

“…The Xi administration has begun to pay significantly more attention to the second track, particularly since 2014 following a spate of attacks that included a bombing at an Urumqi railway station while Xi Jinping was visiting the region, which was blamed on Uyghur separatists. Since 2017, Xinjiang has witnessed the rise of a security state in the form of intensified securitisation, digital surveillance and the introduction of 're-education' centres (Kam & Clarke, 2021).…”

Cross-border Threats, Reputational Costs and the Evolution of an Authoritarian Club: The Case of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

“…In 2016, Beijing started to round up Uyghurs in Xinjiang and neighbouring countries and put them into controversial re-education camps, which have been criticised as brutal incarceration camps (Raza, 2019; Zenz, 2019). This large-scale social engineering programme aims to pre-emptively crush opposition and effectively negate the possibility of individual resistance in Xinjiang (Kam & Clarke, 2021). Chinese authorities have called back Uyghurs around the world.…”

Ethnic violence and terrorism as internal challenges to China's national security: A case study of Xinjiang

“…The Chinese authorities, however, view the Uyghur movement for self-determination, which has its various forms, from those that are within the framework of peaceful conflict resolution to those that use violence and terrorist acts, as a threat to national security, territorial integrity and stability, placing it in the discursive framework of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Making it a national security issue that threatens the territorial integrity and stability of the state as vital national interests, China justifies the numerous security activities and measures it implements in Xinjiang (Kam and Clarke 2021;Zenz and Leibold, 2019;The State Council Information Office 2019a, Smith Finley 2019Zenz 2018).…”