Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security

Hughes, Bryn

doi:10.1080/14781150701358946

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If so, with what effect on the securitizing move? Do characteristics such as audience use of power relative to the securitizing actor (Hayes, 2013;Balzacq, 2005), unity (Hayes, 2012;Hughes, 2007;Roe, 2008), level of perceived knowledge (Curley and Herington, 2011), access to information (Bright, 2012;Vuori, 2008;Collins, 2005), and intensity of engagement (Collins, 2005;Wilkinson, 2007) provide audiences with greater or lesser influence over securitization processes and outcomes? By addressing questions such as these, securitization analysts will be in a position to provide a much stronger assessment of the role and potential influence of the audience within securitization processes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within the empirical work, the identity of the audience varies widely. Many studies focus either explicitly or implicitly on the general public within a democratic state (Roe, 2008;Abrahamsen, 2005;Hughes, 2007;Hayes, 2012;Salter, 2008;Floyd, 2010). In some studies, however, the audience is a specific branch of government (Bright, 2012;Roe, 2008;Salter, 2008;Vuori, 2008), local elites (Curley and Herington, 2011), donors (Vaughn, 2009), organizational colleagues (Vaughn, 2009;Salter, 2008), or technical experts (Salter and Piché, 2011), among others.…”

Section: Assessing the Securitization Audience In Empirical Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory

Côté

2016

Security Dialogue

122

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article assesses the role of the audience in securitization theory. The main argument is that in order to accurately capture the role of the securitization audience, it must be theorized as an active agent, capable of having a meaningful effect on the intersubjective construction of security values. Through a meta-synthesis of 32 empirical studies of securitization, this article focuses on two central questions: (1) Who is the audience? (2) How does the audience engage in the construction of security? When assessed against the theoretical works on securitization, this analysis reveals that the manner in which the audience is defined and characterized within securitization theory differs with the empirical literature that investigates securitization processes. Where the empirical literature suggests securitization is a highly intersubjective process involving active audiences, securitization theory characterizes audiences as agents without agency, thereby marginalizing the theory’s intersubjective nature. This article sketches a new characterization of the securitization audience and outlines a framework for securitizing actor–audience interaction that better accounts for securitization theory’s linguistic and intersubjective character, addresses this theoretical/empirical conflict, and improves our understanding of how groups select and justify security priorities and costly security policies.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Assessing the Securitization Audience In Empirical Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory

Côté

2016

Security Dialogue

122

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This is the subject of the next chapter. (Hughes, 2007), the facilitating role of 9/11 imagery in the securitization process (Moller, 2007), the role of American commercial media in facilitating securitizing moves (O'Reilly, 2008), and the dynamics of securitization within the United Kingdom (Roe, 2008) and the European Union (Stahl, 2008). While this research has made great strides in mapping what is perhaps the most significant instance of securitization in the last decade of world politics, the related debate between realist academia and neoconservative commentators has received little attention from this perspective.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here I focus on the 2003 debate leading up to the Iraq War. While the Iraq War is often taken as an instance of securitization (Hughes, 2007;Moller, 2007;O'Relly, 2007;Roe, 2008;Stahl, 2007), Brian C. Schmidt and Michael C. Williams (2008) In September, 2002, a group of prominent realists took out a paid advertisement in the New York Times where they contested the rationale for viewing Iraq as a security threat warranting preventative war ("War with Iraq is not in America's National Interest", 2002). This can be read as a group of security analysts discouraging a negative securitization, defined as a move that would fail to resolve the underlying issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.…”

Section: Floyd and The Consequentialist Evaluation Of Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The framing of Iraq as an existential threat in 2003 relied upon multiple lower level processes of securitization that included rhetorics of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and humanitarian violations (Hughes, 2007). In this respect, the 2003 Iraq War, as a manifestation of the broader Global War on Terror, can been seen as an instance of macrosecuritization; a process which aggregates and subordinates lower level securitization processes to a broader and more over-arching theme (Buzan and Waever, 2009:257).…”

Section: Realism and The Contested Securitization Of Iraqmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Intervening in the language of security : emotion, appraisal and securitization theory

Rythoven¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Are Democrats or Republicans better for the Iraqi Kurds?

Hama

2024

World Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This piece offers an introduction to US foreign policy toward the Iraqi Kurds since the First World War by dividing that policy into seven discernible stages—from Wilson's Fourteen Points to the actions of the Trump administration. In doing so, I query whether the existence of US foreign policy toward the Kurds has been more active and supportive during Democratic Party administrations or Republican Party administrations. Are there any clear indications as to which party has been better for the Iraqi Kurds? Or is US foreign policy toward the Iraqi Kurds unequivocally dependent on regional dynamics and US interests, not on which political party is governing or the values they espouse? The central argument is that American policy toward the Iraqi Kurds has mostly been dependent on changing regional dynamics, particularly on the changing nature of the United States relationships with Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria, and this does not seem to be affected strongly by which US party holds the presidency. Perhaps counter‐intuitively, there is no evidence to suggest the Democrats have been better for the Iraqi Kurds than the Republicans. While some of the most significant setbacks for the Kurds occurred during Republican administrations, their two most essential political achievements were also during Republican administrations.

show abstract

Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration's Social Construction of Security

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory

Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory

Intervening in the language of security : emotion, appraisal and securitization theory

Are Democrats or Republicans better for the Iraqi Kurds?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About