Security analysis of a cancelable iris recognition system based on block remapping

Jenisch, Stefan; Uhl, Andreas

doi:10.1109/icip.2011.6116352

Cited by 25 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Then, a key is used as a seed to represent one particular distortion on the remapped image to prevent reconstruction of the original iris data. Jenisch and Uhl [30] highlighted the vulnerability of the remapping process in the scenario of coalition attack presuming that single or multiple templates are available to an attacker. Increasing the security to the recommended level will sacrifice the performance of the system with more than 100% of EER degradation from 1.244 to 2.846.…”

Section: Related Work Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Better Performance for Protected Iris Biometric System with Confidence Matrix

2021

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Biometric template protection (BTP) schemes are implemented to increase public confidence in biometric systems regarding data privacy and security in recent years. The introduction of BTP has naturally incurred loss of information for security, which leads to performance degradation at the matching stage. Although efforts are shown in the extended work of some iris BTP schemes to improve their recognition performance, there is still a lack of a generalized solution for this problem. In this paper, a trainable approach that requires no further modification on the protected iris biometric templates has been proposed. This approach consists of two strategies to generate a confidence matrix to reduce the performance degradation of iris BTP schemes. The proposed binary confidence matrix showed better performance in noisy iris data, whereas the probability confidence matrix showed better performance in iris databases with better image quality. In addition, our proposed scheme has also taken into consideration the potential effects in recognition performance, which are caused by the database-associated noise masks and the variation in biometric data types produced by different iris BTP schemes. The proposed scheme has reported remarkable improvement in our experiments with various publicly available iris research databases being tested.

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Section: Related Work Problem Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Better Performance for Protected Iris Biometric System with Confidence Matrix

2021

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“…In [24], Jenisch and Uhl applied block permutation and remapping to protecting the iris template. Specifically, in the permutation operation, blocks of the feature texture are rearranged, controlled by a permutation key, and in the remapping operation, some blocks are mapped on top of the other blocks to make the reconstruction of the iris image more difficult.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existing issue: In the abovementioned iris-based authentication schemes, the non-invertible transformations rely on user-specific keys (or parameters), which can also be referred to as key-dependent transformations. However, in some schemes, e.g., [21,24], when the key, which is used to guide the transformation, is known by an adversary, the transformation can be reversed easily. In random projection based schemes, e.g., [23], if multiple transformed feature vectors and keys are lost, the adversary can restore the original feature vector from the attacks via record multiplicity (ARM) [27,28].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Cancelable Iris- and Steganography-Based User Authentication System for the Internet of Things

Yang

Wang

et al. 2019

Sensors

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Remote user authentication for Internet of Things (IoT) devices is critical to IoT security, as it helps prevent unauthorized access to IoT networks. Biometrics is an appealing authentication technique due to its advantages over traditional password-based authentication. However, the protection of biometric data itself is also important, as original biometric data cannot be replaced or reissued if compromised. In this paper, we propose a cancelable iris- and steganography-based user authentication system to provide user authentication and secure the original iris data. Most of the existing cancelable iris biometric systems need a user-specific key to guide feature transformation, e.g., permutation or random projection, which is also known as key-dependent transformation. One issue associated with key-dependent transformations is that if the user-specific key is compromised, some useful information can be leaked and exploited by adversaries to restore the original iris feature data. To mitigate this risk, the proposed scheme enhances system security by integrating an effective information-hiding technique—steganography. By concealing the user-specific key, the threat of key exposure-related attacks, e.g., attacks via record multiplicity, can be defused, thus heightening the overall system security and complementing the protection offered by cancelable biometric techniques.

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“…The random and repeated remapping process prevents the reconstruction of the original iris image. Although the non-invertibility criterion was fulfilled through the block remapping process, Jenisch et al [46] demonstrated that 60% of the original iris image could be reconstructed from the stolen template.…”

Section: Cancelable Biometricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Design for Alignment-Free Chaffed Cancelable Iris Key Binding Scheme

et al. 2019

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Iris has been found to be unique and consistent over time despite its random nature. Unprotected biometric (iris) template raises concerns in security and privacy, as numerous large-scale iris recognition projects have been deployed worldwide—for instance, susceptibility to attacks, cumbersome renewability, and cross-matching. Template protection schemes from biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics are expected to restore the confidence in biometrics regarding data privacy, given the great advancement in recent years. However, a majority of the biometric template protection schemes have uncertainties in guaranteeing criteria such as unlinkability, irreversibility, and revocability, while maintaining significant performance. Fuzzy commitment, a theoretically secure biometric key binding scheme, is vulnerable due to the inherent dependency of the biometric features and its reliance on error correction code (ECC). In this paper, an alignment-free and cancelable iris key binding scheme without ECC is proposed. The proposed system protects the binary biometric data, i.e., IrisCodes, from security and privacy attacks through a strong and size varying non-invertible cancelable transform. The proposed scheme provides flexibility in system storage and authentication speed via controllable hashed code length. We also proposed a fast key regeneration without either re-enrollment or constant storage of seeds. The experimental results and security analysis show the validity of the proposed scheme.

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Security analysis of a cancelable iris recognition system based on block remapping

Cited by 25 publications

References 6 publications

Towards Better Performance for Protected Iris Biometric System with Confidence Matrix

Towards Better Performance for Protected Iris Biometric System with Confidence Matrix

A Cancelable Iris- and Steganography-Based User Authentication System for the Internet of Things

A New Design for Alignment-Free Chaffed Cancelable Iris Key Binding Scheme

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