Security Analysis of the Certificateless Signature Scheme Proposed at SecUbiq 2006

Abstract

Abstract. In this paper, we show that the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Yap, Heng and Goi at SecUbiq 2006 is insecure against a key replacement attack and a malicious-but-passive KGC attack, respectively. The former implies that anyone who replaces a signer's public key can forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key. The latter supposes the malicious-but-passive KGC, which generates system parameters based on the information of the target user to impersonate. Our results are based on the fact that the private key of the YHG scheme has the form of a BLS multisignature generated by the KGC and the user. Finally, we review the vulnerability of several certificateless signature schemes under theses attacks.

An efficient and provably‐secure certificateless signature scheme without bilinear pairings

“…In their scheme, the signing algorithm does not require pairing computation and the verification algorithm only needs two bilinear pairing computations. Unfortunately, Park and Kang found that the scheme of Yap et al is insecure against a key replacement attack. Zhang attack.…”

Weaknesses and improvements of an efficient certificateless signature scheme without using bilinear pairings

“…Huang et al also proposed a new CLS scheme. Some relatively more efficient and secure CLS schemes [9,11,14] were proposed to overcome this high computational cost. However, because Hu et al [6] showed that their scheme cannot resist type 1 adversaries, Yum and Lee improved their scheme.…”

“…However, these three schemes require three or four pairing operations for signature verification. Some relatively more efficient and secure CLS schemes [9,11,14] were proposed to overcome this high computational cost.…”

“…To date, most of the certificateless signature (CLS) schemes are based on bilinear pairings [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14]. As is known, the pairing operation is a heavier operation than the other public key operations, such as Elliptic Curve point multiplication.…”

Pairing-Free Certificateless Signature with Security Proof

“…Gorantla and Saxena [5] proposed an efficient CLS scheme, but Cao et al [6] showed that their scheme is insecure against Type I adversary. Since then, many CLS schemes [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15] have been proposed. However, only few of them, for example, [10][11][12], are secure against these two types of adversaries; others are vulnerable to the key replacement attack.…”