Security analysis of the Dependability, Security Reconfigurability framework

Abstract

Introducing security and security functionality in a large scale Communication and Information System will increase the complexity of these systems. Complexity in general is seen as an important aspect of possible insecure systems. In this paper we describe the threats that need to be addressed if a specific security solution like the DESEREC (Dependability and Security by Enhanced Reconfigurability) framework is deployed in a large scale Communication and Information System. Also the necessary minimal countermeasures and corresponding security requirements are described. This work reflects our experiences within the DESEREC project, partly funded by the European Union.

Privacy-by-design based on quantitative threat modeling

“…Finally, although not directly related with PbD for the sake of completeness are worth to mention approaches solely focused on either (i) quantitative threat modeling (e.g., in TMAP [19] which quantifies threats related with Commercial Off The Shelf systems -COTS -), (ii) security requirements elicitation methodologies based on risk analysis (e.g., CORAS [14], OCTAVE [20] and ISRAM [21] although they are not embedded into a TMM and -except for ISRAM -do not consider the quantitative aggregation of risks), (iii) rigorous methods for analyzing security specifications (e.g., Weldemariam and Villafiorita [22], [23] where model checking is used to derive security attacks in a e-voting scenario) and, (iv) qualitative methods to elicit security requirements (e.g., DESEREC [24]). …”

Network Attack Analysis and the Behaviour Engine

“…CIS reconfiguration was the highest mechanism for survivability. [33] Incidents were defined as being caused by the sequential occurrence of certain events, be it accidental or deliberate. A CORRELATION of these events defined the existence of an incident, following the implementation of correlation rules.…”