Security and Privacy in Vehicular Social Networks

Jin, Hongyu; Khodaei, Mohammad; Papadimitratos, Panos

doi:10.1201/9781315368450-12

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…2) End-to-end Latency: We are primarily concerned with the end-to-end latency, i.e., the delay for pseudonym acquisition, measured at the vehicle, calculated from the initialization of Protocol 1 till the successful completion of Protocol 2. 3 Table VII details the latency statistics to obtain pseudonyms with different policies for the two datasets. Figs.…”

Section: A Experimental Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Vehicular Communication (VC) systems can generally enhance transportation safety and efficiency with a gamut of applications, ranging from collision avoidance alerts to traffic conditions updates; moreover, they can integrate and enrich Location Based Services (LBSs) [1,2] and vehicular social networks [3], and provide infotainment services. In VC systems, vehicles are provided with On-Board Units (OBUs) to communicate with each other (Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication), or with Roadside Units (RSUs) (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems

Khodaei

Jin

Papadimitratos

2018

IEEE Trans. Intell. Transport. Syst.

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119

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Several years of academic and industrial research efforts have converged to a common understanding on fundamental security building blocks for the upcoming Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus towards deploying a special-purpose identity and credential management infrastructure, i.e., a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), enabling pseudonymous authentication, with standardization efforts towards that direction. In spite of the progress made by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI) and harmonization efforts (Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC)), significant questions remain unanswered towards deploying a VPKI. Deep understanding of the VPKI, a central building block of secure and privacy-preserving VC systems, is still lacking. This paper contributes to the closing of this gap. We present SECMACE, a VPKI system, which is compatible with the IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI standards specifications. We provide a detailed description of our state-of-the-art VPKI that improves upon existing proposals in terms of security and privacy protection, and efficiency. SECMACE facilitates multi-domain operations in the VC systems and enhances user privacy, notably preventing linking pseudonyms based on timing information and offering increased protection even against honest-but-curious VPKI entities. We propose multiple policies for the vehicle-VPKI interactions, based on which and two large-scale mobility trace datasets, we evaluate the full-blown implementation of SECMACE. With very little attention on the VPKI performance thus far, our results reveal that modest computing resources can support a large area of vehicles with very low delays and the most promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead.

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Section: A Experimental Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems

Khodaei

Jin

Papadimitratos

2018

IEEE Trans. Intell. Transport. Syst.

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119

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“…Considering secure vehicular communications, Papadimitratos [59] analyzed the security challenges in vehicular communication systems while Jin et al [60] extend the analysis to the privacy landscape. Raya et al [61] described the need for a vehicular PKI to secure vehicular communications, and Khodaei et al [62] proposed a generic pseudonymization approach to preserve the unlinkability of messages exchanged between vehicles and PKI servers.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

HERMES: Scalable, Secure, and Privacy-Enhancing Vehicle Access System

Symeonidis¹,

Rotaru²,

Mustafa³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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We propose HERMES, a scalable, secure, and privacy-enhancing system, which allows users to share and access vehicles. HERMES outsources the vehicle access token generation to a set of untrusted servers, utilizing several cryptographic primitives with secure multi-party computation efficiently. It conceals the vehicle secret keys and transaction details from the servers, including vehicle booking details, access token information, and user-vehicle identities. It also provides user accountability in case of disputes. We prove that HERMES meets its security and privacy requirements. Moreover, we demonstrate that HERMES scales for a large number of users and vehicles, making it practical for real-world deployments. To achieve high-performance computations, we evaluate HERMES over two different multiparty computation protocols for Boolean and arithmetic circuits. We provide a detailed comparison of their performance, together with other state-of-the-art access provision protocols. Our performance analysis demonstrates that HERMES requires only ≈ 61ms for a single-vehicle access provision through a proofof-concept implementation. At the same time, it handles 546 and 84 access token generations per second from a single-vehicle owner and large branches of rental companies with over a thousand vehicles, respectively.

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“…Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications seek to enhance transportation safety and efficiency with a gamut of applications, ranging from collision avoidance alerts to traffic conditions updates; moreover, they can integrate and enrich Location Based Services (LBSs) [1], [2] and vehicular social networks [3], and provide infotainment services. It has been well-understood that Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are vulnerable to attacks and that the privacy of their users is at stake.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is a double-edged sword: abusive peers, seeking to compromise the trustworthiness of the system, could pollute the CRL distribution and mount a clogging DoS attack. Such an attack relates other content dissemination, e.g., vehicular social networks [3], yet it is critical to mitigate it for CRL distribution: delaying or preventing legitimate users from obtaining the most up-to-date CRL pieces would result in prolonging the operation of a malicious compromised vehicle in the system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scalable & Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate Revocation List Distribution in Vehicular Communication Systems

Khodaei

Papadimitratos

2021

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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In spite of progress in securing Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, there is no consensus on how to distribute Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). The main challenges lie exactly in (i) crafting an efficient and timely distribution of CRLs for numerous anonymous credentials, pseudonyms, (ii) maintaining strong privacy for vehicles prior to revocation events, even with honest-but-curious system entities, (iii) and catering to computation and communication constraints of on-board units with intermittent connectivity to the infrastructure. Relying on peers to distribute the CRLs is a double-edged sword: abusive peers could "pollute" the process, thus degrading the timely CRLs distribution. In this paper, we propose a vehicle-centric solution that addresses all these challenges and thus closes a gap in the literature. Our scheme radically reduces CRL distribution overhead: each vehicle receives CRLs corresponding only to its region of operation and its actual trip duration. Moreover, a "fingerprint" of CRL 'pieces' is attached to a subset of (verifiable) pseudonyms for fast CRL 'piece' validation (while mitigating resource depletion attacks abusing the CRL distribution). Our experimental evaluation shows that our scheme is efficient, scalable, dependable, and practical: with no more than 25 KB/s of traffic load, the latest CRL can be delivered to 95% of the vehicles in a region (15×15 KM) within 15s, i.e., more than 40 times faster than the state-of-the-art. Overall, our scheme is a comprehensive solution that complements standards and can catalyze the deployment of secure and privacy-protecting VC systems.

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Security and Privacy in Vehicular Social Networks

Cited by 6 publications

References 32 publications

SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems

SECMACE: Scalable and Robust Identity and Credential Management Infrastructure in Vehicular Communication Systems

HERMES: Scalable, Secure, and Privacy-Enhancing Vehicle Access System

Scalable & Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate Revocation List Distribution in Vehicular Communication Systems

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