Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust 2011
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9_4
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Security Based on Physical Unclonability and Disorder

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Cited by 125 publications
(104 citation statements)
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“…PUFs are often subdivided in two classes, depending on their number of CRPs [11]. Weak PUFs have few CRPs, often linearly increasing with the required IC area.…”
Section: Challenge-response Pairs and Their Secrecymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PUFs are often subdivided in two classes, depending on their number of CRPs [11]. Weak PUFs have few CRPs, often linearly increasing with the required IC area.…”
Section: Challenge-response Pairs and Their Secrecymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The US government and semiconductor companies point out potential system susceptible to danger resulting from the contract foundry model, hardware intellectual property and IC theft, as well as counterfeiting [7,8]. Further aspects of PUF design, performance and security foundations applicable to our work can be found in [3,9,10].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, PUFs can be designed to make it prohibitively hard to simulate, emulate, or predict their behavior [2]. Excellent surveys of various PUF designs can be found in [3]- [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A secure Strong PUF should be resilient against machine learning attacks which aim at predicting the PUF response to random new challenges by studying a set of known PUF CRPs. Strong PUFs have been used in several applications of identification and authentication of hardware systems [3].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%