2008 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference 2008
DOI: 10.1109/wcnc.2008.445
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Security Considerations for Handover Schemes in Mobile WiMAX Networks

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Cited by 25 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Compromising PMK enables an attacker to launch ''false base station'' attacks on a legitimate MS during R3HO [24], thus breaches S3. Non-compliance with S2 in the optional HHO was also shown in [20].…”
Section: Standard Handover Protocols and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 84%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Compromising PMK enables an attacker to launch ''false base station'' attacks on a legitimate MS during R3HO [24], thus breaches S3. Non-compliance with S2 in the optional HHO was also shown in [20].…”
Section: Standard Handover Protocols and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 84%
“…In MDHO and FBSS, the MS registers and maintains a list of potential TBSs and is required to share its security context with them. MDHO and FBSS do not satisfy security requirements S1-S4, introduce additional traffic in the network and require more complex hardware [20][21][22]. Due to these problems, we are only considering HHOs in this paper.…”
Section: Standard Handover Protocols and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In this Figure, the result of EAP authentication protocol is MSK. Then both the MS and BS make a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by removing some bits of the MSK using a number of functions such as Dot16KDF [12], and also they generate an Authorization Key (AK) from the PMK. After making the AK, the BS and MS will establish the Key Encryption Key (KEK) from the AK.…”
Section: Rsa-based Authenticationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this way, for each MS i there are two sets of keys as follows: Figure 7 shows the revised version of ELAPSE. Here, a node i in subgroup 2 has three keys SGKEK 1234, SGKEK 12 and SGKEK 2 as well as a two-key set SGFSet i 2 and SGBSet i 2 . Upon member join or leave event, the rekeying algorithm updates SGKEKs and GTEK, but there is no change in SGFSet and SGBSet sets.…”
Section: Rekeying Algorithmsmentioning
confidence: 99%