Security in Large-Scale Open Distributed Multi-Agent Systems

Oey,; Warnier, Martijn; Brazier, Frances M. T.

doi:10.5772/9656

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 42 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…Signed code was suggested in Jansen (2000) as a technique with which agent platforms can detect tampering on agent code or data. Recently, Oey and Brazier (2010) also presented techniques for detecting tampering by malicious platforms on mobile agent code and data. Protecting mobile agent code and data when they visit malicious platforms is a difficult task; however, digital signatures applied by a trusted platform can be used to enforce integrity of agent code and data.…”

Section: Digital Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Agent Security Against Malicious Platforms

Ssekibuule

2010

Cybernetics and Systems

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This article presents a review of security mechanisms that have been developed for mobile agent security against malicious platforms. It has been almost 10 years since a prominent review of security in agent systems was presented by Jansen (2000). We present new developments that have been suggested over the years, evaluate limitations of these schemes, and highlight possible areas of improvement. This article further presents possible threats to the mobile agent paradigm and distinguishes between detection and prevention security mechanisms.

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Section: Digital Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Agent Security Against Malicious Platforms

Ssekibuule

2010

Cybernetics and Systems

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“…The kernel manages a secure communication [Oey et al, 2010b] and acts as an agent container. The AgentScape middleware provides a number of system services such as 'location managers', 'host managers', 'agent servers' and 'service servers'.…”

Section: Figure 25mentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-level reconfigurable self-organization in overlay services

Pournaras¹

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“…There have been many attempts to protect mobile agents from the host platform in the literature (Jansen and Karygiannis 2000), (Oey, Warnier and Brazier 2010) and (Ngereki 2015); some are based on cryptography while others are not; e.g. code obfuscation (Majumdar and Thomborson 2005), function encryption (Lee, Alves-Foss and Harrison 2004) and (Zhu and Xiang 2011), environmental key generation (Riordan and Schneier 1998), execution tracing (Tan and Moreau 2002), and agent monitoring (Page, Zaslavsky and Indrawan 2005).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure information sharing in social agent interactions using information flow analysis

Bijani

Robertson

Aspinall

2018

Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence

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When we wish to coordinate complex, cooperative tasks in open multi-agent systems, where each agent has autonomy and the agents have not been designed to work together, we need a way for the agents themselves to determine the social norms that govern collective behaviour. An effective way to define social norms for agent communication is through the use of interaction models such as those expressed in the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a compact executable specification language based on logic programming and pi-calculus. Open multi-agent systems have experienced growing popularity in the multi-agent community and gain importance as large scale distributed systems become more widespread. A major practical limitation to such systems is security, because the very openness of such systems opens the doors to adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities introduced through acceptance of social norms. This paper addresses a key vulnerability of security of open multi-agent systems governed by formal models of social norms (as exemplified by LCC). A fundamental limitation of conventional security mechanisms (e.g. access control and encryption) is the inability to prevent information from being propagated. Focusing on information leakage in choreography systems using LCC, we suggest a framework to detect insecure information flows. A novel security-typed LCC language is proposed to prevent information leakage. Both static (design-time) and dynamic (run-time) security type checking are employed to guarantee no information leakage can occur in annotated agent interaction models. The proposed security type system is discussed and then formally evaluated by proving its properties. Two disadvantages of the pure dynamic analysis are its late detection and its inability to detect implicit information flows. We overcome these issues by performing static analysis. The proposed security type system supports non-interference, i.e. high-security input to the program never affect low-security output. However, it disregards information leaks due to the termination of the program.

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Security in Large-Scale Open Distributed Multi-Agent Systems

Cited by 10 publications

References 42 publications

Mobile Agent Security Against Malicious Platforms

Mobile Agent Security Against Malicious Platforms

Multi-level reconfigurable self-organization in overlay services

Secure information sharing in social agent interactions using information flow analysis

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