Security Patterns for Physical Access Control Systems

Fernández, Eduardo B.; Ballesteros, Jose; Desouza-Doucet, Ana C.; Larrondo-Petrie, María M.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-73538-0_19

Cited by 14 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Another direction is to add constraints to the patterns to make them more precise and rigorous. Physical access control can also be integrated by using appropriate patterns [17]. In this paper, we have merely shown the idea of security patterns.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On building secure SCADA systems using security patterns

Fernández

Larrondo-Petrie

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information

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Critical infrastructure systems are important systems that support our daily lives. Protecting these systems is attracting attention from the research community. The key component of a critical infrastructure system is the process control system, also known as the supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system. On the other hand, security patterns are a well established concept that are used to analyze, construct and evaluate secure systems. This paper aims to propose methods to build a secure SCADA system using security patterns. In this paper, we study the architecture of a general SCADA system and analyze the potential attacks against it. Also, we use security patterns as a tool to design a secure SCADA system that is resistant to these attacks. We believe our research work lays a new direction for future research on secure SCADA systems.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On building secure SCADA systems using security patterns

Fernández

Larrondo-Petrie

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Applying a continuous learning mode, no dedicated training phase exists. Here the main question is after how many bookings (the so called 'init phase' 6 , the card usage behavior is expected to be stable, 6. Notice, we carefully distinguish the init phase from the training phase, since after the init phase the model is still extended with every new card-door combination, while after a training phase, the model is frozen.…”

Section: Model Stability and Agingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Specifically, methods from user entity behavior analytics (UEBA) [5], used to determine fraudulent behavior on enterprise endpoints, are a boon to CPS by determining behavior profiles of entities within a CPS -and pinpoint any kinds of behavior anomalies on top of that. In this paper, we take a closer look into the application of AD in physical access control systems [6]. Here, key cards allow users to enter areas of a building for which they have been authorized.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavior-Based Anomaly Detection in Log Data of Physical Access Control Systems

Skopik

Wurzenberger

Höld

et al. 2023

IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.

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Behavior-based anomaly detection (AD) approaches for enterprise-IT security are not easily applicable to other domains, such as embedded devices and IoT nodes in cyber-physical systems. AD approaches are usually highly optimized for specific purposes, tightly bound to domain-specific technologies and rely on a specific syntax of investigated data. Data from cyber-physical systems is however highly diverse, often poorly documented and not easily ingested for automated analysis. AECID provides an anomaly detection approach, that monitors unstructured textual event data (i.e., log data), and implements self-learning for autonomous operation. A parser generator establishes a model of normal system behavior on top of observed events, which then can be leveraged to detect anomalies as deviations from that baseline. The unsupervised anomaly detection approaches of AECID apply machine learning techniques to perform sequence analysis, correlation analysis and statistical tests of events represented in log data. This paper discusses AECID's applicability in a building security system use case. A proof of concept demonstrates the effective detection of anomalies in log data of a building access control system stemming from card misuse, including stolen access cards and cloned cards.

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“…Here, it was identified that policies are made by multiple people which is a problem our approach of global control solves. Types of access patterns are also studied [8,14,19]: Access policies according to time schedules and emergencies, access policies for people without RFID cards, and dependent access are of great importance. The first and the third problem are solvable by our approach and the second one seems like an intrinsic problem to physical access control.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model Checking Branching Properties on Petri Nets with Transits (Full Version)

Finkbeiner,

Gieseking,

Hecking-Harbusch

et al. 2020

Preprint

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To model check concurrent systems, it is convenient to distinguish between the data flow and the control. Correctness is specified on the level of data flow whereas the system is configured on the level of control. Petri nets with transits and Flow-LTL are a corresponding formalism. In Flow-LTL, both the correctness of the data flow and assumptions on fairness and maximality for the control are expressed in linear time. So far, branching behavior cannot be specified for Petri nets with transits. In this paper, we introduce Flow-CTL * to express the intended branching behavior of the data flow while maintaining LTL for fairness and maximality assumptions on the control. We encode physical access control with policy updates as Petri nets with transits and give standard requirements in Flow-CTL * . For model checking, we reduce the model checking problem of Petri nets with transits against Flow-CTL * via automata constructions to the model checking problem of Petri nets against LTL. Thereby, physical access control with policy updates under fairness assumptions for an unbounded number of people can be verified. ‡ This is an extended version of [11].

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Security Patterns for Physical Access Control Systems

Cited by 14 publications

References 9 publications

On building secure SCADA systems using security patterns

On building secure SCADA systems using security patterns

Behavior-Based Anomaly Detection in Log Data of Physical Access Control Systems

Model Checking Branching Properties on Petri Nets with Transits (Full Version)

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