Security requirements modelling for virtualized 5G small cell networks

Abstract

It is well acknowledged that one of the key enabling factors for the realization of future 5G networks will be the small cell (SC) technology. Furthermore, recent advances in the fields of network functions virtualization (NFV) and software-defined networking (SDN) open up the possibility of deploying advanced services at the network edge. In the context of mobile/cellular networks this is referred to as mobile edge computing (MEC). Within the scope of the EU-funded research project SESAME we perform a comprehensive security modelling of MEC-assisted quality-of-experience (QoE) enhancement of fast moving users in a virtualized SC wireless network, and demonstrate it through a representative scenario toward 5G. Our modelling and analysis is based on a formal security requirements engineering methodology called Secure Tropos which has been extended to support MECbased SC networks. In the proposed model, critical resources which need protection, and potential security threats are identified. Furthermore, we identify appropriate security constraints and suitable security mechanisms for 5G networks. Thus, we reveal that existing security mechanisms need adaptation to face emerging security threats in 5G networks.

An investigation into software quality and security: Past research works and existing gaps

“…Here, threats are defined by looking into the possibilities of spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information leakage, denial of services [221], and elevation in the given situation. The authors in [222] explain that numerous security approaches have been developed to assist the software engineers in evaluating security risks, such approaches include Attack Trees, combining goal-orientation and use-case modeling (an effective method of software requirement engineering) [223] and Secure Tropos (a security-oriented extension to the goal-driven requirements engineering methodology) [224]. Other approaches allow the software engineers to address these risks by reusing design decisions [225] or sustaining the decision making process [226].…”

A Systematic Literature Mapping on the Security of 5G and Vertical Applications

“…Solutions in using 5G and other networks (e.g., Wi-Fi). Bhuyan et al, 2021;Ksentini and Frangoudis, 2020;Gonzalez et al, 2020;Liyanage et al, 2018;Wang and Yan, 2015;Tahir et al, 2020;Azzaoui et al, 2020;Nieto et al, 2017Nieto et al, , 2018Zhang and Lin, 2017;Compagno et al, 2017;Dik and Berger, 2021;Benzaid and Taleb, 2020;Zhao et al, 2021a;Bitsikas and Pöpper, 2021;Chaudhary et al, 2020;Gao et al, 2021;Sood et al, 2021;Cao et al, 2020;Ding et al, 2022b;Wu et al, 2018;Shi and Sagduyu, 2021;Sullivan et al, 2021;Mei et al, 2018;Gebremariam et al, 2021;Ginzboorg and Niemi, 2016;Rotinsulu and Fitri Sari, 2018;Vassilakis et al, 2017;Ar-joune and Faruque, 2020]. An adversary can maliciously (1) use legitimate orchestrator access to manipulate the configuration and run a compromised network function, (2) take advantage of malicious insiders attacks, (3) perform unauthorized access (e.g., to confidential data [Isaksson and Norrman, 2020] and to RFID tags [Rahimi et al, 2018]), (4) tampering, (5) perform resource exhaustion, (6) turn services unavailable, ( 7) analyze or modify traffic, (8) perform data leakage (e.g., capturing valuable personal information [Bordel et al, 2021;Annessi et al, 2018;Vreman and Maggio, 2019]), (…”

Fast and Universal Inter-Slice Handover Authentication with Privacy Protection in 5G Network

“…To realize more efficient handover authentication, Vassilakis et al [23] introduced Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) servers to assist authentication, making MEC servers reduce the delay of authentication caching users' information. However, the core network still needed to exchange users' information with the MEC server, which will increase communication overhead.…”