Security sector reform and civil-military relations in postwar Côte d’Ivoire

Security Consolidation in the Aftermath of Civil War: Explaining the Fates of Victorious Militias

“…This often involves reforming the formal military apparatus and including members of armed wing of the rebellion and its affiliate militias in a newly structured national army. Consistent with the principal-agent logic often used to model the relationship between states and militias, new ruling elites can expect less shirking and a lower risk of betrayal if the military has elements of the non-state groups that brought them to power, especially relative to the military they recently defeated (Martin 2018). In combination with the significant and positive relationship between Rebel Victory and militia disintegration, this result suggests that rebel non-state forces rarely function well as auxiliaries or repressive forces in the post-war environment: they must either be appeased and integrated or suppressed if political tension, social unrest, or renewed conflict is to be avoided (Steinert, Steinert, and Carey 2019).…”

“…If a government chooses not to disintegrate its militias, it will sometimes absorb them into the official military. This can be a useful strategy for co-opting certain groups (Staniland 2015), but integrating untrained, violent, and possibly unruly armed militants may also impair the military's coherence, organizational structure and operational efficacy (Krebs and Licklider 2015;Martin 2018). Military integration is a costly process that requires the investment of resources as well as institutional buy-in from the regular military corps, 3 and overcoming these hurdles still does not guarantee that integration will subdue these new units, let alone satisfy their independent interests (Krebs and Licklider 2015).…”

“…Thus, auxiliary militias, regardless of their own capabilities, may prefer to remain independent rather than accepting more constraints within a weak military organization and the possibility of fewer material payoffs. 4 Compounding these issues, the poor operational abilities that characterize weak military organizations constrain their ability to monitor and control untrained and possibly unruly militia members who join the official military (Gaub 2011;Martin 2018). Integrating non-state forces into these militaries can cause "deep dysfunction and fragmentation .…”

Military integration and intelligence capacity: informational effects of incorporating former rebels

“…Hall 2014; P. A. Martin 2018). Increasing trust over time can increase confidence in the quality of intelligence provided by ex-rebels, though this may also work in the other direction, with vital intelligence tips helping build trust.…”

Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018

“…However, users should exercise caution so as to not conflate entries as independent events. For example, Martin's recent assessment of civil-military relations in Coˆte d'Ivoire reports over 40 mutinous events in the country in 2017 alone (Martin, 2018). Aside from using a far broader definition that combines different types of activities, a review of the data suggests that ACLED records a conflict event as a distinct/separate event if it occurs in different locations, leading to duplicates.…”