Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries

EU security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or resist?

“…This also mirrors more general assessments in the literature which note that despite the growth of SSR programs worldwide, their effectiveness has been limited (De Larrinaga & Doucet, 2015, p. 58;Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014, p. 135;Sedra, 2017). In order to explain this conundrum, local perspectives need to be brought back into the equation.…”

“…In other words, in trying to explain the failures of SSR programs, the emphasis has been on international strategies and practices, while neglecting local agency and domestic politics (Schroeder & Chappuis, 2014, p. 136). Yet, an increasing body of literature has explored the role of domestic actors in the outcome of SSR, either by identifying how domestic actors are able to undermine or support international reform efforts, by showing how domestic structures shape the actual implementation of the reforms or the role of non-state actors (see, for instance, Sedra, 2017;Valters, Van Veen, & Denney, 2015). More attention has also been paid to the outcomes of interactions between international and local actors in SSR, for instance, as the outcome of a rational choice game (Berg, 2014).…”

“…By doing so, not only have they implicitly supported the normative model underpinning the liberal peace, but they have also neglected the analysis of power relations in the context of SSR programs. A new generation of SSR scholarship is increasingly concerned with theorizing SSR processes and outcomes by drawing on the literature on state-building and the liberal peace, including debates about hybrid security governance (Schroeder, Chappuis, & Kocak, 2014) and limited statehood (Koehler & Gosztonyi, 2014) which have challenged Weberian notions of the state (Hills, 2014;Sedra, 2017). Moreover, SSR has been theorized from different perspectives, from sociological approaches (Blaustein, 2014) to organizational theory to Foucauldian, and postcolonial studies (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2017).…”

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections†

“…A 2010 survey focusing on police malfeasance revealed that recruits were forbidden to carry guns when they were off duty after reports that they were using them to rob civilians. Police frequently bribe civilians: “[W]hen [Afghan citizens] interact with the police, it is often to pay bribes or illegal taxes” (Sedra, , p. 179); 25% of UN survey respondents reported having paid at least one bribe to police in the previous year (UNODC, ; surely an undercount), and the police and the justice system were perceived to be the two most corrupt sectors in 2006 (Torabi & Delesgues, ). Police reportedly have also engaged in rape, torture, and extrajudicial executions of civilians (Giustozzi, ): “In 2010, nearly 200 policemen were accused of murder and just over 4,600 were involved in crimes in 3,026 separate cases sent to the Attorney General in Kabul” (Sedra, , pp.…”

“…Additional pre‐election accounts of police behavior are instructive for understanding election day police–citizen interactions. As a NATO report from 2010 noted, “most Afghans had come to view the ANP as lawless armed men, rather than trusted law enforcement officials” (quoted in Sedra, , p. 182). In the few months before the election, the government began deploying more soldiers and police and setup more checkpoints on roads: “Besides choking off Taliban routes into Kandahar, the checkpoints are designed to persuade Afghans that the arrival of U.S.‐trained forces will end endemic police corruption” (Nissenbaum, ).…”