Security Weaknesses in Bluetooth

Jakobsson, Markus; Wetzel, Susanne

doi:10.1007/3-540-45353-9_14

Cited by 182 publications

(146 citation statements)

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“…In [2], some man-in-the-middle and impersonation type of attacks are proposed where the attacker knows or can guess the PIN or existing link key between victims. Relay attacks are similar to man-in-the-middle attacks.…”

Section: Relay Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There exists an adversary located between the sender and receiver, but the only activity of the adversary is to relay information that it receives from one to another without changing the content. Unlike the attacks in [2], the adversary does not need to know a shared secret.…”

Section: Relay Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The attacker impersonates those victims by forwarding authentication messages generated by one of them to another between the piconets. As opposed to the man-in-the-middle attacks described in [2], the attacker does not need to know any shared secret between the victims in order to set up our relay attacks. We simulate relay attacks to assess their feasibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relay Attacks on Bluetooth Authentication and Solutions

Lévi

Çetintaş

Aydos

et al. 2004

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We describe relay attacks on Bluetooth authentication protocol. The aim of these attacks is impersonation. The attacker does not need to guess or obtain a common secret known to both victims in order to set up these attacks, merely to relay the information it receives from one victim to the other during the authentication protocol run. Bluetooth authentication protocol allows such a relay if the victims do not hear each other. Such a setting is highly probable. We analyze the attacks for several scenarios and propose practical solutions. Moreover, we simulate attacks to make sure about their feasibility. These simulations show that current Bluetooth specifications do not have defensive mechanisms for relay attacks. However, relay attacks create a significant partial delay during the connection that might be useful for detection.

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Section: Relay Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relay Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Relay Attacks on Bluetooth Authentication and Solutions

Lévi

Çetintaş

Aydos

et al. 2004

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…They eventually leak such an information by releasing some S and F(S, K i ) for some function F from the protocol. In the Bluetooth case, this attack was described by Jakobsson and Wetzel [17].…”

Section: Bluetooth-like Pre-pairing and The Security Issuementioning

confidence: 97%

On Bluetooth Repairing: Key Agreement Based on Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Vaudenay

2005

Information Security and Cryptology

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Abstract. Despite many good (secure) key agreement protocols based on publickey cryptography exist, secure associations between two wireless devices are often established using symmetric-key cryptography for cost reasons. The consequence is that common daily used security protocols such as Bluetooth pairing are insecure in the sense that an adversary can easily extract the main private key from the protocol communications. Nevertheless, we show that a feature in the Bluetooth standard provides a pragmatic and costless protocol that can eventually repair privateless associations, thanks to mobility. This proves (in the random oracle model) the pragmatic security of the Bluetooth pairing protocol when repairing is used. Setting up Secure CommunicationsDigital communications are often secured by means of symmetric encryption and message authentication codes. This provided high throughput and security. However, setting up this channel requires agreeing on a private key with large entropy. Private key agreement between remote peers through insecure channel is a big challenge. A first (impractical) solution was proposed in 1975 by Merkle [19]. A solution was proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [12]. It works, provided that the two peers can communicate over an authenticated channel which protects the integrity of messages and that a standard computational problem (namely, the Diffie-Hellman problem) is hard.To authenticate messages of the Diffie-Hellman protocol is still expensive since those messages are pretty long (typically, a thousand bits, each) and that authentication is often manually done by human beings. Folklore solutions consist of shrinking this amount of information by means of a collision-resistant hash function and of authenticating only the digest of the protocol transcript. The amount of information to authenticate typically reduces to 160 bits. However, collision-resistant hash functions are threatened species these days due to collapses of MD5, RIPEMD, SHA, etc. [9,23,24,25,26]. Furthermore, 160 bits is still pretty large for human beings to authenticate. Another solution using shorter messages have been proposed by Pasini and Vaudenay [20] using

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“…Bluetooth (v2.0 and older) is known to be subject to searching attack due to its reliance on an arbitrarily human selected passkey [16], and its pairing process generally require a long time which makes it not well user-friendly.…”

Section: Bluetoothmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobile Electronic Identity: Securing Payment on Mobile Phones

Chen¹,

Roscoe²

2011

Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication

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Abstract. The pervasive use of mobile phones has created a dynamic computing platform that a large percentage of the population carries routinely. There is a growing trend of integrating mobile phones with electronic identity, giving the phone the ability to prove or support the identity of the owner by containing, for example, a tuple of name, ID, photo and public key. While this helps phone owners prove who they are, it does not prove to them that they are giving their identities to intended parties. This is important in its own right for reasons of privacy and avoiding cases of "identity theft", but all the more important when identity is being provided to support the transfer of value (e.g. in mobile payment) or information. In this paper we show how Human Interactive Security Protocols can support this type of authentication in cases where PKIs are inappropriate, misunderstood or too expensive, concentrating on the case of payment.

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Security Weaknesses in Bluetooth

Cited by 182 publications

References 1 publication

Relay Attacks on Bluetooth Authentication and Solutions

Relay Attacks on Bluetooth Authentication and Solutions

On Bluetooth Repairing: Key Agreement Based on Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Mobile Electronic Identity: Securing Payment on Mobile Phones

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