Seeing the mind of robots: Harm augments mind perception but benevolent intentions reduce dehumanisation of artificial entities in visual vignettes

Abstract

A ccording to moral typecasting theory, good-and evil-doers (agents) interact with the recipients of their actions (patients) in a moral dyad. When this dyad is completed, mind attribution towards intentionally harmed liminal minds is enhanced. However, from a dehumanisation view, malevolent actions may instead result in a denial of humanness. To contrast both accounts, a visual vignette experiment (N = 253) depicted either malevolent or benevolent intentions towards robotic or human avatars. Additionally, we examined the role of harm-salience by showing patients as either harmed, or still unharmed. The results revealed significantly increased mind attribution towards visibly harmed patients, mediated by perceived pain and expressed empathy. Benevolent and malevolent intentions were evaluated respectively as morally right or wrong, but their impact on the patient was diminished for the robotic avatar. Contrary to dehumanisation predictions, our manipulation of intentions failed to affect mind perception. Nonetheless, benevolent intentions reduced dehumanisation of the patients. Moreover, when pain and empathy were statistically controlled, the effect of intentions on mind perception was mediated by dehumanisation. These findings suggest that perceived intentions might only be indirectly tied to mind perception, and that their role may be better understood when additionally accounting for empathy and dehumanisation.

The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review

“…Some of this research provides evidence that people empathize with artificial entities and respond negatively to actions that appear to harm or insult them (Darling, 2016 ; Freier, 2008 ; Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al, 2013 ; Suzuki et al, 2015 ). Bartneck and Keijsers ( 2020 ) found no significant difference between participants’ ratings of the moral acceptability of abuse towards a human or a robot, but other researchers have found evidence that current artificial entities are granted less moral consideration than humans (Slater et al, 2006 ; Gray et al, 2007 ; Bartneck & Hu, 2008 ; Küster & Świderska, 2016 ; Akechi et al, 2018 ; Sommer et al, 2019 ; Nijssen et al, 2019 ; Küster and Świderska, 2020 ).…”

“…There is also evidence that people in individual rather than group settings (Hall, 2005 ), with prior experience interacting with robots (Spence et al, 2018 ), or presented with information promoting support for robot rights, such as “examples of non-human entities that are currently granted legal personhood” (Lima et al, 2020 ) are more willing to grant artificial entities moral consideration. Other studies have examined the conditions under which people are most willing to attribute high mental capacities to artificial entities (Briggs et al, 2014 ; Fraune et al, 2017 ; Gray & Wegner, 2012 ; Küster & Swiderska, 2020 ; Küster et al, 2020 ; McLaughlin & Rose, 2018 ; Swiderska & Küster, 2018 , 2020 ; Wallkötter et al, 2020 ; Wang & Krumhuber, 2018 ; Ward et al, 2013 ; Wortham, 2018 ).…”

“…Some of the discussion focuses on the risks for artificial sentience, noting that ”colonizing space would make [related] adverse outcomes more probable” Krämer ( 2020 ) Though not exploring moral consideration of artificial entities per se, Krämer argues that, “robots cannot be rightly seen as possessors of dignity” and this is presented as affecting questions of “how humans should treat robots, and how robots should treat each other” Krebs ( 2006 ) This article “examines the influence of mangas and animes on the social perception and cultural understanding of robots in Japan.” Robot rights are discussed, as are relevant cultural factors in Japan Kunnari ( 2020 ) Kunnari “examines what kind of moral patiency and agency an android character Lore is granted in the science-fiction television show Star Trek: The Next Generation” and “employs philosophical theories of morality in analyzing Lore’s treatment by different characters” Kuran ( 2020 ) Kuran reviews “the literature on the moral status of AI, emphasizing that although a majority of philosophers agree that AI could plausibly have moral status based on capacities, there is disagreement about the specific degree to which such AI has moral status.” Kuran argues in favor of a “capacity-based approach that recognizes AI as moral patients or agents depending on the context” Küster and Świderska ( 2016 ) In this experiment, Küster and Świderska compared responses to a human or humanoid robot being apparently either presented flowers or tasered. They found “a significant difference in the pairwise comparison between benevolent vs. malevolent intention towards the robot” but that “when the malevolent action was being carried out against the human, it was evaluated as more morally wrong than when carried out against the robot” Küster and Swiderska ( 2020 ) Küster and Swiderska found that, contrary to their previous experiments, “manipulation of intentions” (benevolent vs. malevolent) failed to affect mind perception.“ However, they found that ”benevolent intentions reduced dehumanisation of the patients.” They also found that, “[b]enevolent and malevolent intentions were evaluated respectively as morally right or wrong, but their impact on the patient was diminished for the robotic avatar” Küster et al ( 2020 ) Küster, Swiderska, and Gunkel examined responses to “four popular online videos of a leading robotics company (Boston Dynamics) and one more familiar vacuum cleaning robot (Roomba).” The results suggest that, “unexpectedly human-like abilities might provide more potent cues to mind perception than appearance, whereas appearance may attract more compassion and protection” Laukyte ( …”

“… 3 See “ Focus and terminology .” For examples of their use, see Küster and Swiderska ( 2020 ) and Coeckelbergh ( 2010b ). …”

When your boss is a robot: Workers are more spiteful to robot supervisors that seem more human

“…The ability to feel pain is not tied to agency but instead to experience. Although we focused primarily on agency, future studies should also explore the importance of experience, especially given work on the "harm-made mind" which finds that the very act of inflicting harm increases perceptions of experience (Ward, Olsen, & Wegner, 2013; for harm-made mind research in the robotic contexts, see Küster & Swiderska, 2021;Swiderska & Küster, 2020).…”