Segmentation of intentions towards COVID-19 vaccine acceptance through political and health behaviour explanatory models

Abstract

Background Management of the COVID-19 pandemic has been plagued by an online 'infodemic', not least on the topic of vaccine safety. Failure to vaccinate is often addressed with corrective, factually based information. However, this may be overly simplistic. European vaccine hesitancy levels correlate closely with popularity of populist parties while scientific populism refers specifically to populist distrust in scientific expertise. Aims and method Combining an evaluation of risk through the health belief model and the cognitive constructs from the theory of planned behaviour, with the influence of populist statements, anticipated regret, trust, and past healthcare behaviour, an online survey explored the components of vaccine decisions amongst a demographically representative Irish adult sample (N = 1995). ResultsThe regression model accounted for a large proportion of variance amongst the total sample. A primary set of influences suggests a considered risk evaluative decision-making approach while a second tier of weaker influences incorporates a broader set of values beyond cost-benefit analysis. Six ideological subsets were identified through K-means analysis. Segments were differentiated by subjective norms attitudes (particularly around social media), populist political attitudes, self-efficacy, perceptions of COVID-19 severity, and susceptibility to the condition. Conclusions While the 'right thing to do' is clear when viewed through a lens of scientific expert advice, this is precisely the paradigm which populist movement rejects. Segmentations, such as the outputs from this study, validate the importance of proactively engaging with diverse communities both on and offline and afford a framework for developing and evaluating more refined, targeted, policies and interventions.

Models of determinants of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in non-pregnant and pregnant population: Review of current literature”

“…The TPB has been used as a tool to assess vaccine hesitancy in a multitude of vaccinations globally. The TPB has been used to evaluate general and childhood vaccine hesitancy in Italy, 82 China, 83 Canada, 84 and the United States; 85 influenza vaccination in the United States; 74 , 86–88 HPV vaccination in the United States; 41 , 89 Hepatitis B vaccination in Uganda; 66 Swine Flu vaccination in the United Kingdom; 90 the Boostrix-IPV vaccination in the United Kingdom; 91 and COVID-19 vaccination in the United States, 46 , 92 Bangladesh, 54–56 Ireland, 93 New Zealand, 94 Pakistan, 95 and Malta. 96 While this list is not conclusive, it begins to illustrate the versatility and usability of the TPB.…”

“I'm luckier than everybody else!”: Optimistic bias, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, vaccination status, and the link with the time spent online, anticipated regret, and the perceived threat

“…Furthermore, we found a significant negative association between the optimism bias and the anticipated regret for vaccination in the group of participants who reported they would definitely get vaccinated, which is a novelty brought by the present study, given its focus on four separate participant groups. Anticipated regret was suggested as a significant predictor of vaccination intention in several previous studies [e.g., ( 51 , 68 , 69 )]. Also, according to the results of a study that aimed to examine the main factors of vaccine hesitancy from the perspective of HBM and TPB, anticipated regret was the most significant predictor of vaccination, with a high score of anticipated vaccination regret indicating a more negative attitude toward of vaccination ( 12 ).…”

“I don’t care, ’cause I don’t trust them!” The impact of information sources, institutional trust, and right-wing populist attitudes on the perception of the COVID-19 pandemic during the first lockdown in Germany.

“…Additionally, studies show that trust in those institutions also impacts the processing and the effects of the information provided by those institutions on science-related issues. For example, in a study by Hart and Nisbet (2012), climate-relevant knowledge only led to more climate concern among those citizens who also trusted the information provided by scientists (Gauchat, 2018;Rountree & Prentice, 2021). Therefore, we put forward our second hypothesis:…”

“…Also, as the term interpretive communities suggests, these groups can be thought of as collectives that share common viewpoints and perceptions, that potentially interact closely, and that are predisposed to similar specific interpretations of events and information. Against this backdrop, we chose a segmentation approach because we wanted to highlight the fact that the population can not Full Paper only be thought of as a mass of individual audience members but also as a constellation of distinct milieus (or target audiences) that would need to be addressed differently by, for example, health-related information campaigns (for similar approaches concerning COVID-19 misinformation and vaccination intentions see Agley &Xiao, 2021 andRountree &Prentice, 2021;more generally Hine et al, 2017).…”

“…First attacking the government for not reacting quickly to the pandemic, they switched their positions to become stern critics of many Corona measures, often being close to pandemic deniers (Jungkunz, 2021). All in all, it seems likely that citizens holding stronger anti-elite right-wing populist attitudes should be more inclined to disbelief the official, expert, and media sources about the COVID-19 pandemic and to disapprove measures concerning the pandemic (see also Rountree & Prentice, 2021). Therefore, we put forward our next hypothesis:…”