2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.05.038
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Selective functional integration between anterior temporal and distinct fronto-mesolimbic regions during guilt and indignation

Abstract: It has been hypothesized that the experience of different moral sentiments such as guilt and indignation is underpinned by activation in temporal and fronto-mesolimbic regions and that functional integration between these regions is necessary for the differentiated experience of these moral sentiments. A recent fMRI study revealed that the right superior anterior temporal lobe (ATL) was activated irrespective of the context of moral feelings (guilt or indignation). This region has been associated with context-… Show more

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Cited by 43 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…These regions were largely consistent with the regions about which we hypothesized based on prior work, particularly with respect to inferior frontal gyrus (Shin et al, 2000; Takahashi et al, 2004), frontopolar cortex (Basile et al, 2010; Moll et al, 2007; Moll et al, 2011), dorsomedial PFC (Kedia et al, 2008; Takahashi et al, 2004), supramarginal gyrus (Kedia et al, 2008; Moll et al, 2007), and at a reduced significance threshold also septal/subgenual cingulate areas (Basile et al, 2010; Green et al, 2010; Moll et al, 2011; Zahn et al, 2009a; Zahn et al, 2009c). However, other hypothesized areas including the posterior STS (Takahashi et al, 2004), posterior cingulate/precuneus (Basile et al, 2010; Kedia et al, 2008) and the anterior temporal poles (Shin et al, 2000) were not observed in our results.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
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“…These regions were largely consistent with the regions about which we hypothesized based on prior work, particularly with respect to inferior frontal gyrus (Shin et al, 2000; Takahashi et al, 2004), frontopolar cortex (Basile et al, 2010; Moll et al, 2007; Moll et al, 2011), dorsomedial PFC (Kedia et al, 2008; Takahashi et al, 2004), supramarginal gyrus (Kedia et al, 2008; Moll et al, 2007), and at a reduced significance threshold also septal/subgenual cingulate areas (Basile et al, 2010; Green et al, 2010; Moll et al, 2011; Zahn et al, 2009a; Zahn et al, 2009c). However, other hypothesized areas including the posterior STS (Takahashi et al, 2004), posterior cingulate/precuneus (Basile et al, 2010; Kedia et al, 2008) and the anterior temporal poles (Shin et al, 2000) were not observed in our results.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…For instance, Shin and colleagues (2000) also examined a similar range of emotions and compared the magnitude of these emotions elicited by guilt scripts as compared to neutral scripts. However, Shin et al and most prior studies did not actually compare the magnitude of these emotions to the magnitude of guilt elicited specifically by the guilt scripts (Basile et al, 2010; Kedia et al, 2008; Ruby and Decety, 2004; Shin et al, 2000; Takahashi et al, 2004; Zahn et al, 2009c), while some assessed this relationship in a few select emotions (Green et al, 2010; Kedia et al, 2008; Zahn et al, 2009c) or none at all (Basile et al, 2010; Takahashi et al, 2004). One notable exception by Moll et al (2007) found that the emotional scripts elicited the following emotions in order of intensity: indignation-other, guilt, compassion, embarrassment, indignation-self, and disgust.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…This was based on the assumption that people are not able to distinguish emotions such as shame, guilt, or self-contempt/disgust well [16]. Recent work on the neural basis of moral emotions [38], however, has shown that participants exhibit distinctive neural signatures to be associated with stimuli subjectively reported as evocative of a particular moral emotion [39,40]. This is in keeping with anthropological evidence of transcultural ubiquity of distinct moral emotions [41] that must rely on transculturally stable conceptual underpinnings [42].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%