Selektivität und direkte Wirkungen von Vermittlungsgutscheinen: Empirische Befunde aus der Einführungsphase

Abstract

In April 2002 German government introduced job placement vouchers as a new instrument of active labour market policy to foster the transition of unemployed to jobs. This paper investigates the demand, the treatment effect of the treated and the economic efficiency of job placement vouchers issued from May 2003 to June 2004. The analysis employs a large sample of unemployed individuals from administrative data collected by the German Federal Employment Agency. 20 percent of the West German and 37 percent of the East German unemployed demanded a voucher. According to the microeconometric results the treatment impact of the treated is positive. 5 out of 100 voucher recipients found a job as a result of the instrument. An additional analysis of the cost and returns of the voucher scheme reveals that the return remains positive if no more than 70 per cent of the direct effects are compensated by indirect (substitution) effects.

Job Placement via Private vs. Public Employment Agencies: Investigating Selection Effects and Job Match Quality in Germany

“…In previous literature, it has been argued that efficiency gains might be realized when job seekers are placed by private as opposed to public agencies. Such efficiency gains might result from monetary incentives due to the performance-based pay of private agencies (Pfeiffer and Winterhager 2006). Private placement might improve the employer-employee matching compared to placement by the public agency, for example through better testing of job seekers or reduced information asymmetries between employers and job seekers (Beckmann et al 2004).…”

Job Placement Via Private vs. Public Employment Agencies: Investigating Selection Effects and Job Match Quality in Germany

“…In previous literature, it has been argued that efficiency gains might be realized when job seekers are placed by private as opposed to public agencies. Such efficiency gains might result from monetary incentives due to the performance-based pay of private agencies (Pfeiffer and Winterhager, 2006). Private placement might improve the employeremployee matching compared to placement by the public agency, for example by conducting better testing of job seekers or by reducing information asymmetries between employers and job seekers (Beckmann, Deimel, and Schauenberg, 2004).…”