Self-Containment

Abstract

In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, thus implying that war ensues. With imperfect information, however, peace may ensue as countries credibly signal to their rival a more peaceful stance since contestants are more reluctant to enter in an armed confrontation with a potentially understaffed army. Using data on the 1975 to 2001 period, we provide supportive evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military officers, and are therefore better informed of their armies’ fighting preparedness, the likelihood of observing an international conflict is higher.

Ethnic Cleavages in Nigeria: The Bane of Good Governance

“…This study adopted the conflict theory, Conflict theory which was propounded in 1848 by Karl Marx, a 19 th century political philosopher explains that society is in a continuous state of conflict, because of diverse groups in it, who compete for limited resources. Conflict theory holds that social order is maintained by domination and power, rather than by consensus and conformity (Adam 2020). The theory explains here, the competition between the ethnic groups to ascend the position of governance and abuses the power attached to such offices to enrich self, family, cronies and sometimes extend a vestige of such illicitly and corruptly acquired wealth to one's ethnic group/kinsmen or do them some favour.…”

Overconfidence and conflict

“…This is not to say that overconfidence was the sole explanatory factor for the initiation and duration of these wars. Other important factors include the fact that war‐related decisions are made by politicians but fought by the military, thence giving birth to coordination and incentive alignment questions (e.g., Adam & Sekeris, 2017), but also the misalignment of citizens’ and politicians’ preferences (e.g., Jackson & Morelli, 2007), the changing nature of the strategic environment (development of new weaponry, changing alliances, etc. ), or even ideological biases pushing actors to seemingly irrational moves that may nevertheless be totally rational given their (rational) preferences (Schrock‐Jacobson, 2012).…”