Self-control by pigeons in the prisoner's dilemma

Baker, Forest; Rachlin, Howard

doi:10.3758/bf03196303

Cited by 28 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Moreover, using what Colman (2003) characterized as "the bedrock of methodological individualism," anonymous individuals are asked to express their preference while physically isolated in separate compartments that minimize or totally eliminate social interaction both when behaving and when receiving reinforcements. This approach has been used with both animals (e.g., Baker and Rachlin, 2002b;Clements and Stephens, 1995;Flood et al, 1983;Green et al, 1995) and humans (e.g., Baker and Rachlin, 2002a;Colman, 2003;Fehr and Gachter, 2002;Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003;Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). In some models, the opponent is not even a live subject but a computer (e.g., Baker and Rachlin, 2002a).…”

Section: Choice From the Economic Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preference can be shifted to the "cooperative" option by manipulations that have no special relevance to social behavior. These include canceling out the deleterious consequences of "discounting" on the effectiveness of delayed reinforcers (Stephens et al, 2002) or associating external cues to facilitate the discrimination between the consequences of prior choices (Baker and Rachlin, 2002b).…”

Section: Choice From a Behavioral Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

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Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Schuster

2004

Behavioural Processes

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Cooperation is usually explained from an economic perspective focused mainly on the tangible outcomes received by individuals that are also dependent on the behavior of others, with little reference to the actual behaviors used when cooperating. The potential consequences of social dimensions associated with cooperative behaviors are minimized in Skinnerian and game-theory models by means of anonymous subjects that behave individually while physically isolated in separate chambers. When cooperation and non-cooperation occur in the real world, however, they are often associated not only with different outcomes but also with different behaviors. Unlike non-cooperation, cooperative behaviors are usually intrinsically social, influenced by the presence and behaviors of familiar partners. Research is described that addresses whether the social dimensions of cooperative actions go beyond mere description of behaviors to also explain why cooperation occurs. One way to resolve the relative importance of economic and social factors for explanations of cooperation is to measure choice between the options of cooperation and non-cooperation. The economic perspective, linked to models derived from game theory, frames the question as a choice determined by differences in tangible outcomes such as food or money that, in evolutionary terms, are surrogates for gains in fitness. From a behavioral perspective, the choice between cooperation and non-cooperation is also determined by social dimensions associated only with cooperation. The influence of social cooperation on preference was examined by means of two rectangular chambers interconnected by a T-maze. In one chamber, pairs of laboratory rats were reinforced with saccharine solution for coordinating back-and-forth shuttling; in the second chamber, a single animal was reinforced for back-and-forth shuttling performed in isolation. With outcomes equalized between the two options, cooperation was preferred by the majority of subjects. Moreover, variation in the relative rate of reinforcement during cooperation was not a strong predictor of choice whereas the level of intra-pair coordination was positively related to preference. Implications of this result are discussed for both method and theory, including the hypothesis that the preference is influenced by intrinsic reinforcements evoked by cooperating. The consequences for evolutionary fitness would then arise not only from tangible outcomes but from the relationships that develop when cooperating even when immediate and tangible pay-offs are absent, insufficient or sub-optimal. The impact of cooperative relationships on fitness may therefore not occur immediately but in the future, and perhaps in another context, when they influence outcomes that have a significant impact on survival and reproduction.

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Section: Choice From the Economic Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Choice From a Behavioral Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Schuster

2004

Behavioural Processes

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“…However, without immediate reinforcement of defection, the blue jays faced no choice dilemma, either of social cooperation or of self-control. Baker and Rachlin (2002) argued that the pigeons in Green et al's (1995) experiment might have defected because of the relatively long duration of each trial (25 sec). If a pigeon's choices were to have been affected by Green et al's (1995) experimental contingencies, its responses would have had to be sensitive to reinforcement delivered 32 sec later.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If a pigeon's choices were to have been affected by Green et al's (1995) experimental contingencies, its responses would have had to be sensitive to reinforcement delivered 32 sec later. 2 Accordingly, Baker and Rachlin (2002) attempted to increase cooperation by reducing the duration of each trial and providing feedback that signaled the previous trial's choice.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Learning by pigeons playing against tit-for-tat in an operant prisoner’s dilemma

Sanabria

Baker

Rachlin

2003

Learning & Behavior

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Each of four pigeons was exposed to a single random-ratio schedule of reinforcement in which the probability of reinforcement for a peck on either of two keys was 1/25. Reinforcer amounts were determined by an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) matrix in which the "other player" (a computer) played tit-for-tat. One key served as the cooperation (C) key; the other served as the defection (D) key. If a peck was scheduled to be reinforced and the D-key was pecked, the immediate reinforcer of that peck was always higher than it would have been had the C-key been pecked. However, if the C-key was pecked and the following peck was scheduled to be reinforced, reinforcement amount for pecks on either key were higher than they would have been if the previous peck had been on the D-key. Although immediate reinforcement was always higher for D-pecks, the overall reinforcement rate increased linearly with the proportion of C-pecks. C-pecks thus constituted a form of self-control. All the pigeons initially defected with this procedure. However, when feedback signals were introduced that indicated which key had last been pecked, cooperation (relative rate of C-pecks)-hence, self-control-increased for all the pigeons.

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Self-control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task

Fantino

Gaitan

Meyer

et al. 2006

J. Behav. Decis. Making

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Self-control was studied in an iterated one-player Prisoner's Dilemma game in which students' choices affected the payoff matrix on the next trial. The frequency of selfcontrol responses (choice of the smaller payoff now, but with the more generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) and defection responses (choice of the larger payoff now, but with the less generous payoff matrix more likely on the next trial) were measured. In Experiment 1, players achieved a criterion of five consecutive self-control responses more quickly as a positive function of trial spacing, the presence between trials of a discriminative stimulus associated with the upcoming payoff matrix, and the probability that the self-control or defection response would be reciprocated by the computer. Experiment 2 replicated the effect of trial spacing except when there was an interfering task during the interval, suggesting that trial spacing permits better appreciation of the contingencies.

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Self-control by pigeons in the prisoner's dilemma

Cited by 28 publications

References 16 publications

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Learning by pigeons playing against tit-for-tat in an operant prisoner’s dilemma

Self-control in a Prisoner's Dilemma game: the role of trial spacing and an interfering task

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