Self-deception and the selectivity problem

Jurjako, Marko

doi:10.5840/bjp2013524

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Whether affectivism supports non-intentionalism thus depends on whether it can solve the selectivity problem. For argument's sake, we do not examine the intentionalist solution, nor do we consider alternative solutions to the problem (Pedrini, 2010;Jurjako, 2013); our only purpose is to refine the affectivist agenda. Our first desideratum is the following: Selectivity: Affectivism distinguishes the cases in which desires lead to deceptive beliefs from the cases in which it does not.…”

Section: The Affectivist Agendamentioning

confidence: 99%

What Does Emotion Teach Us About Self-Deception? Affective Neuroscience in Support of Non-Intentionalism

Lauria¹,

Preissmann

2018

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that is, in evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns (the affective-filter view). We develop this conception by taking into consideration the underlying mechanisms governing self-deception, particularly the neurobiological mechanisms of somatic markers and dopamine regulation. Shifting the discussion to this level can fulfill the affectivist aspirations, as this approach clearly favours non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of self-deception. We support this claim by criticizing the main alternative affectivist account—namely, the views that self-deception functions to reduce anxiety or is motivated by anxiety. Describing self-deception’s dynamic does not require intention; affect is sufficient if we use the insights of neuroscience and the psychology of affective bias to examine this issue. In this way, affectivism can fulfill its promises

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Section: The Affectivist Agendamentioning

confidence: 99%