2005
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2058-y
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Self-deception as the root of political failure

Abstract: I consider models of political failure based on self-deception. Individuals discard free information when that information damages their self-image and thus lowers their utility. More specifically, individuals prefer to feel good about their previously chosen affiliations and shape their worldviews accordingly. This model helps explain the relative robustness of political failure in light of extensive free information, and it helps explain the rarity of truth-seeking behavior in political debate. The comparati… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…Politicians and activists clearly try to sway values. While they do provide some information, they often actively encourage bad thinking habits like confirmation bias and groupthink (Glaeser and Sunstein 2009;Cowen 2005). As a result, partisanship and ideology make it easy for people to believe that the economic policies they favor have conveniently good consequences.…”
Section: Gss Variable Identifier Importsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Politicians and activists clearly try to sway values. While they do provide some information, they often actively encourage bad thinking habits like confirmation bias and groupthink (Glaeser and Sunstein 2009;Cowen 2005). As a result, partisanship and ideology make it easy for people to believe that the economic policies they favor have conveniently good consequences.…”
Section: Gss Variable Identifier Importsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the absence of substantive agency, participants become involved in a dialog of discourse that easily can become dishonest and fraudulent, or at least self-deceptive (Cowen 2005). With respect to Pareto's (1935) formulation, the gap between derivations (which were the public rationalizations people advanced to explain their actions) and residues (which were the foundational sentiments that informed action) would surely widen.…”
Section: The Institutional Framework For Political Calculationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They strategically select public policies that mobilize co-partisans, bribe swing voters, and/or divide the opposition (Downs 1957;Stigler 1970;Cox 2009). Elite office-seekers strategically showcase and/or hasten the benefits of their agenda, while hiding and/or delaying its costs (Wagner 1976;Cowen 2005;Kotlikoff 2005). They strategically deceive uninformed but nonetheless pivotal segments of the electorate, whether by passively flattering their existing hopes and fears or by actively stoking new ones (Horowitz 1985;Brennan and Lomasky 1997;Glassner 2000;Glaeser 2005;Caplan 2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The improvement could be reckoned in terms of, for example, the magnitude of supermajority consensus, of economic growth rates, of life expectancies, or of the spread of basic political freedoms. disbursement (Olson 1993), of negative spill-over effects on the income or wellbeing one's own coalition-members (Olson and McGuire 1996), of eliciting a blocking response by other veto players (Tsebelis 2002), of making it less costly for the opposition to bid for moderates or swing voters (North et al 2009: 125-129), and of undermining voters and office-seekers' public-images and/or self-images as benevolent, competent actors (Schuessler 2000;Caplan 2001;Cowen 2005). If the gamesmanship goes too far, it hurts rather than helps office-seekers' chances of winning elections.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%