Self‐disclosure ain't what it's cracked up to be, at least not yet

Busch, Fred

doi:10.1080/07351699809534208

Cited by 8 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…One significant reason for an uncritical adherence to anonymity involves the theory wars that have characterized our discipline over the past forty years, if not longer. Busch (1998) clearly exemplifies those analysts who tend to equate self-disclosure with eschewing a Freudian model of therapeutic action:…”

Section: Mutative Actionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Such theoretical rigidity fails to consider the real issue: the place of selfdisclosure in the model of mutative action used by an individual analyst. Even Busch (1998) notes, "Ultimately, it is the analyst's underlying theory of mind that aids in determining the value of self-disclosure for the analytic process" (p. 519). Renik (1995), in his advocacy for selfdisclosure, echoes this point: "Of course, underlying my thinking about technique is an assumption about the mechanism of action of clinical psychoanalysis" (p. 493).…”

Section: Mutative Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They fail to realize that this is not the case. As Busch (1998) points out, "While structural theory has been seen as antithetical to selfdisclosures, there is nothing inherent in the model that suggests this need be the case" (p. 519).…”

Section: Mutative Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Reluctance to Self-Disclose: Reflexive or Reasoned?

Sugarman¹

2012

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

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Despite a growing body of clinical literature advocating the thoughtful and judicious use of self-disclosure in psychoanalysis, there remains a reflexive reluctance to intervene in this way by many analysts of various theoretical persuasions. Why is this the case? Four motives for this reflexive reluctance to self-disclose are discussed: (1) theoretical reasons; (2) psychoanalytic authoritarianism; (3) fears of influencing the patient through suggestion; and (4) the analyst's personality characteristics. Examining the reasons for this state of affairs should help to reduce the rigidity or orthodoxy with which clinical psychoanalysis is practiced.

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Section: Mutative Actionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Mutative Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Reluctance to Self-Disclose: Reflexive or Reasoned?

Sugarman¹

2012

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

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“…The clinical examples presented here illustrate the ease with which elective self-disclosure can become the enactment of a countertransference resistance if it is employed in the face of unaddressed transference material, and if the analyst does not facilitate the patient's use of the ego's observational capacity (Busch 1998). Renik's position that our theory of technique cannot help us determine the appropriateness of self-disclosure (1996, p. 513) does not hold if the need to protect the transference and refrain from gratifying the patient's wishes is accepted theory.…”

Section: Closing Observationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, the impact of the patient on the analyst was noted by Ferenczi as early as the 1920s (Jacobs 1999). Previous contributions to this subject have centered on philosophical and theoretical critiques of Renik's view of subjectivity and transference-countertransference (e.g., Cavell 1998;Hanly 1998Hanly ,1999Louw and Pitman 2001;Psychoanalytic Inquiry 1998), analyst neutrality and authority (e.g., Adler and Bachant 1996;Eagle, Wolitzky, and Wakefield 2001;Kernberg 1996), the interactional and technical aspects of analysis as conceptualized by the intersubjective school (e.g., Bachant and Adler 1997;Busch 1998;Eagle, Wolitzky, and Wakefield 2001;Hanly 1998;Jacobs 1991Jacobs , 1999, and the relation between neutrality, abstinence, and the therapeutic alliance (Meissner 1996(Meissner , 2002. Previous contributions to this subject have centered on philosophical and theoretical critiques of Renik's view of subjectivity and transference-countertransference (e.g., Cavell 1998;Hanly 1998Hanly ,1999Louw and Pitman 2001;Psychoanalytic Inquiry 1998), analyst neutrality and authority (e.g., Adler and Bachant 1996;Eagle, Wolitzky, and Wakefield 2001;Kernberg 1996), the interactional and technical aspects of analysis as conceptualized by the intersubjective school (e.g., Bachant and Adler 1997;Busch 1998;Eagle, Wolitzky, and Wakefield 2001;Hanly 1998;Jacobs 1991Jacobs , 1999, and the relation between neutrality, abstinence, and the therapeutic alliance (Meissner 1996(Meissner , 2002.…”

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confidence: 99%

Analytic Neutrality, Anonymity, Abstinence, and Elective Self-Disclosure

Shill

2004

J Am Psychoanal Assoc

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Recent contributions to the psychoanalytic literature propose new ways of understanding analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and self-disclosure. They advocate elective self-disclosure by the analyst as an antidote to the allegedly game-playing quality of transference and resistance analysis. The analytic relationship, they assert, becomes unreal when attempts are made to observe the principles of neutrality and abstinence. Both are seen as ill-conceived because of the irreducible subjectivity and unwarranted authority of the analyst. These relational and interactional views are criticized because (1) they ignore the fact that transference and resistance analysis have from Freud onward been accepted as minimal criteria qualifying a clinical process as psychoanalytic; (2) elective self-disclosure carries metapsychological implications dismissing not only Freud's theory of motivation but motivation as a basic feature of human personality; (3) they do not recognize interpersonal relations as mental events and so do not consider the ego's ability to create intrapsychic representations of object relations; (4) elective self-disclosures within the empathic parameters of the analytic situation are themselves unreal compared to the reality of the patient's experience with other objects. Abstinence and neutrality as ideals facilitate maintenance of an internal holding environment or container for the analyst's countertransference.

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Back to the Future

Busch¹

2003

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

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Significant components of psychoanalytic technique, and the theory that underlies it, seem to remain buried in our past, but are central to the growth of psychoanalysis as a treatment method based on understanding a patient's mind. By updating technique based on a theory of mind with structure, the author views the increasing freedom of the patient's mind as central to the curative process, and takes the position that in interpretive work, the analyst needs to pay more attention to the patient's capacity to meaningfully receive and integrate the analyst's interventions.

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Self‐disclosure ain't what it's cracked up to be, at least not yet

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

The Reluctance to Self-Disclose: Reflexive or Reasoned?

The Reluctance to Self-Disclose: Reflexive or Reasoned?

Analytic Neutrality, Anonymity, Abstinence, and Elective Self-Disclosure

Back to the Future

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