Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

Bó, Ernesto Dal; Terviö, Marko

doi:10.3386/w14508

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

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“…First, the employee will be detected and punished by management (the principal) with some probability p that is increasing in theft. Second, the employee may suffer moral or ethical costs based on identity or preferences that make theft costly even when it is effortless and unmonitored (e.g., Mazar et al 2008, Bénabou and Tirole 2011, Dal Bó and Terviö 2013.…”

Section: Spillover Effects From Theft Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity

2015

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T his paper examines how firm investments in technology-based employee monitoring impact both misconduct and productivity. We use unique and detailed theft and sales data from 392 restaurant locations from five firms that adopt a theft monitoring information technology (IT) product. We use difference-in-differences models with staggered adoption dates to estimate the treatment effect of IT monitoring on theft and productivity. We find significant treatment effects in reduced theft and improved productivity that appear to be primarily driven by changed worker behavior rather than worker turnover. We examine four mechanisms that may drive this productivity result: economic and cognitive multitasking, fairness-based motivation, and perceived increases of general oversight. The observed productivity results represent substantial financial benefits to both firms and the legitimate tip-based earnings of workers. Our results suggest that employee misconduct is not solely a function of individual differences in ethics or morality, but can also be influenced by managerial policies that can benefit both firms and employees.

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Section: Spillover Effects From Theft Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity

2015

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Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

Bó

Terviö

2013

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We present an infinite‐horizon planner–doer model of moral standards, where individuals receive random temptations (such as bribe offers) and must decide which to resist. Individual actions depend both on conscious deliberation and on a type reflecting unconscious drives. Temptations yield consumption value, but confidence in being the type of person who resists temptations yields self‐esteem. We identify conditions for individuals to build an introspective reputation for goodness (“moral capital”) and for good actions to lead to a stronger disposition to do good. Bad actions destroy moral capital and lock‐in further wrongdoing. Economic shocks that result in higher temptations have long‐lasting effects on wrongdoing. We show how optimal deterrence can change under endogenous moral costs and how wrongdoing can be compounded as high temptation activities attract individuals with low moral capital.

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Competitive Vices

Branco

Villas-Boas

2015

Journal of Marketing Research

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In markets, firms must compete following a set of rules determined by laws, regulations, and social practices or pressures. This article investigates the effect of the degree of competition on the extent to which firms invest in behaving according to the rules of the marketplace. The authors model investments in following these rules as increasing the firm's marginal costs of production and decreasing its probability of being caught violating the market rules (and thus losing profits). They show that greater competition leads to smaller investments in following the market rules. This leads to (1) the existence of a social optimum degree of competition that is less than perfect competition and (2) more competition in general, thus prompting greater optimal monitoring efforts. Stricter market rules can lead to greater investments in satisfying the market rules and to lower production. The authors also present results on the likelihood of firms having broken the market rules depending on relative market shares, optimal monitoring, and the effect of dynamics on the incentives to satisfy the market rules.

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Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity

Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity

Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing

Competitive Vices

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