Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

Wilson, Eric Entrican

doi:10.1111/papq.12073

Cited by 62 publications

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“…Even if the person forces himself to refrain from acting, the occurrence of the desire diminishes the extent to which he can be said to have overcome the inclination. For discussion of the cited passages, see Guyer 2005, 2013; and Wilson forthcoming.…”

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Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Wilson

2016

Kantian rev.

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Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new 'Kantian' account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard's view. In this article I argue that Kant's own view differs significantly from Schapiro's. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro's 'Kantian' view rests on a much sharper distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. In the process of explaining these (and other) differences, I argue that Kant's own view is in some respects philosophically superior to Schapiro's.

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“…To deal with the passions, one needs to develop self-command. See Baxley 2003, 2010; Guyer 2005, 2013; Louden 2011; Wilson forthcoming.…”

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Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Wilson

2016

Kantian rev.

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Kant on Self-Control

Vujošević

2024

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This Element considers Kant's conception of self-control and the role it plays in his moral philosophy. It offers a detailed interpretation of the different terms used by Kant to explain the phenomenon of moral self-control, such as 'autocracy' and 'inner freedom'. Following Kant's own suggestions, the proposed reading examines the Kantian capacity for self-control as an ability to 'abstract from' various sensible impressions by looking beyond their influence on the mind. This analysis shows that Kant's conception of moral self-control involves two intimately related levels, which need not meet the same criteria. One level is associated with realizing various ends, the other with setting moral ends. The proposed view most effectively accommodates self-control's role in the adoption of virtuous maxims and ethical end-setting. It explains why self-control is central to Kant's conception of virtue and sheds new light on his discussions of moral strength and moral weakness.

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The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015

2019

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Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics

Cited by 62 publications

References 24 publications

Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Habitual Desire: On Kant’s Concept of Inclination

Kant on Self-Control

The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015

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