Self‐Protection, Strategic Interactions, and the Relative Endogeneity of Disease Risks

Reeling, Carson; Horan, Richard D.

doi:10.1093/ajae/aau106

Cited by 23 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…A firm's own risk reduction (X%) and their closest neighbor's risk reduction (Y%) were both presented as random variables from 0% to 100%. These two representations of risk reduction were chosen because the probability that a producer's herd can become infected depends not only on self-protection but also protection of neighbors (Reeling & Horan, 2014). Actions to protect against the entry of a disease into a region are strategic complements as the nature of spatial interactions matter (Hennessy, 2007a By including fixed and variable costs, economic tradeoffs can be considered and the relative influence of each for biosecurity adoption identified.…”

Section: Questionnaire Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These factors are mentioned in many discussions of biosecurity adoption and compliance (Hennessy, 2007a(Hennessy, , 2007b(Hennessy, , 2008Horan, Fenichel, Wolf, & Gramig, 2010;Reeling & Horan, 2014;Wu, Schulz, Tonsor, & Smith, 2017).…”

Section: Questionnaire Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Biosecurity adoption is an example of a private behavior that generates positive spillovers affecting the supply of a public good, that is, infectious disease prevention (Buchanan & Kafoglis, 1963;Olson & Zeckhauser, 1970;Reeling & Horan, 2014). This makes it less clear who will benefit and who will pay for it in the supply chain.…”

Section: Questionnaire Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Using Expert Knowledge to Understand Biosecurity Adoption Aimed at Reducing Tier 1 Disease Risks in the U.S. Livestock Industry

Wu¹,

Schulz²,

Tonsor³

2017

JAS

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Using primary data from a survey of swine, beef cattle, and dairy industry experts in the United States, this study provides insights into adoption of biosecurity measures aimed at reducing Tier 1 disease risks. Experts believe the swine industry would see the highest and the beef cattle industry would see the lowest biosecurity adoption in the first year of a large Tier 1 disease outbreak. Risk reduction has a positive marginal effect on biosecurity adoption, and a firm's own risk reduction matters as well as their closest neighbor's risk reduction. Costs have a negative marginal effect on biosecurity adoption. A key reason explaining partial adoption might be that experts believe industry-wide biosecurity investment would likely bring benefits primarily to downstream sectors in the supply chain and producers would bare most of the costs. More educational materials available to explain Tier 1 disease risks and the benefits of risk mitigating biosecurity measures is found to be the least important factor for adoption and implementation of new, additional biosecurity measures. A producer or neighbor having personally experienced a Tier 1 disease on their operation, a producer's view on their own likelihood of experiencing a Tier 1 disease given their current situation, and a producer's view on effectiveness in reducing Tier 1 disease risks are found to be the most important factors. Understanding how several factors might impact biosecurity adoption aimed at reducing Tier 1 disease risks is necessary for the development of practices and policies that could reduce the impact of such disease incursions.

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Section: Questionnaire Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Questionnaire Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Using Expert Knowledge to Understand Biosecurity Adoption Aimed at Reducing Tier 1 Disease Risks in the U.S. Livestock Industry

Wu¹,

Schulz²,

Tonsor³

2017

JAS

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“…Hennessy (2007) characterizes a preventive action when the probability of acquiring a disease depends on what others do and the gains from being disease free are entirely private. Hennessy (2008) demonstrates the complementary nature of private actions to protect against entry of a highly infectious disease into a region, but Reeling and Horan (2013) qualify the finding when grower actions protect against both entry and spread of an infection.…”

mentioning

confidence: 92%

Strategic Interactions Among Private and Public Efforts When Preventing and Stamping Out a Highly Infectious Animal Disease

Wang¹,

Hennessy

2015

American J Agri Economics

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Upon outbreak of a contagious animal disease, a primary motive for restoring disease-free status is often to regain access to international product markets. Efforts applied toward continuing or regaining such access is a public good-all growers benefit regardless of extent of private efforts taken while exclusion is impractical. Private incentives to take preventive measures and stamp-out efforts interact in complex ways. There are intrafarm temporal interactions and also inter-farm contemporaneous interactions. Public effort also takes place and interacts with private efforts. This paper provides a succinct multi-agent model to explore these interactions in social optimum and in Nash equilibrium, and also to explore how socially optimal and Nash behavior differ. Comparative statics under social optimality are more straightforward than under Nash equilibrium. Whether in social optimum or Nash equilibrium, public prevention efforts complement both private prevention and private stamp-out efforts. However, public stamp-out efforts substitute for both private stamp-out and private prevention efforts. Reasonable conditions are identified under which Nash levels of private prevention and stamp-out efforts are both below socially optimal levels. Concerning policy prescriptions, efforts to secure property rights and reduce property transfer costs should promote prevention and eradication efforts. Other things equal, public prevention effort should be more effective in promoting welfare than comparable public stamp-out effort. Subsidies on private efforts should favor prevention efforts because subsidies on eradication effort may discourage prevention effort. Even if produce from diseased animals is safe to consume and acceptable to consumers, it may be optimal to destroy such produce. Upon outbreak of a contagious animal disease, a primary motive for restoring disease-free status is often to regain access to international product markets. Efforts applied toward continuing or regaining such access is a public good-all growers benefit regardless of extent of private efforts taken while exclusion is impractical. Private incentives to take preventive measures and stamp-out efforts interact in complex ways. There are intra-farm temporal interactions and also inter-farm contemporaneous interactions. Public effort also takes place and interacts with private efforts. This paper provides a succinct multi-agent model to explore these interactions in social optimum and in Nash equilibrium, and also to explore how socially optimal and Nash behavior differ. Comparative statics under social optimality are more straightforward than under Nash equilibrium. Whether in social optimum or Nash equilibrium, public prevention efforts complement both private prevention and private stamp-out efforts.However, public stamp-out efforts substitute for both private stamp-out and private prevention efforts. Reasonable conditions are identified under which Nash levels of private prevention and stamp-out efforts are both below socially optima...

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“…Conversely, a livestock producer’s investment in biosecurity measures can reduce disease risk and potential damages for neighbours and trading partners, leading to positive externalities for these other parties and the potential for free-riding on biosecurity (Hennessy and Wolf 2015 ). This is known as a filterable externality because a producer’s biosecurity choices filter the risk of disease infection and damages to others (Shogren and Crocker 1991 ; Reeling and Horan 2015 , 2017 ). Thus, strategic alliances among producers may emerge as a result of these bilateral interactions (Hennessy et al 2005 ; Hennessy 2007 ; Horan et al 2015 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Livestock Disease Management for Trading Across Different Regulatory Regimes

et al. 2018

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The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’ alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vaccination on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.

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Self‐Protection, Strategic Interactions, and the Relative Endogeneity of Disease Risks

Cited by 23 publications

References 39 publications

Using Expert Knowledge to Understand Biosecurity Adoption Aimed at Reducing Tier 1 Disease Risks in the U.S. Livestock Industry

Using Expert Knowledge to Understand Biosecurity Adoption Aimed at Reducing Tier 1 Disease Risks in the U.S. Livestock Industry

Strategic Interactions Among Private and Public Efforts When Preventing and Stamping Out a Highly Infectious Animal Disease

Livestock Disease Management for Trading Across Different Regulatory Regimes

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