Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Bundi, Pirmin; Varone, Frédéric; Gava, Roy; Widmer, Thomas

doi:10.1017/psrm.2016.35

Cited by 23 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…First, most of the relevant data were gathered through a parliamentary survey. Although this approach provides a comprehensive overview of the parliamentary demand for evaluations, survey data always entail methodical problems that question the analytical power of the sample (Bundi, Varone, Gava, & Widmer, 2016). In doing so, problems of self-selection and misreporting are likely to appear, even if the measurement errors should be distributed equally FIGU RE 4 Predicted probabilities to demand an evaluation for legitimation…”

Section: Res U Ltsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight

Bundi

2017

Governance

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This article demonstrates how attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight across policy fields. Building on the accountability literature, the study develops the argument that parliamentarians will more likely oversee policy fields where cooperative forms of governance are more present, since these policies are more difficult to assess and have a higher need of legitimation. Using the example of policy evaluation demand by members of parliament in Switzerland, the study suggests that parliamentarians seek more control in a policy field, where public activities are more often delegated to nopublic actors or the need for legitimation is particularly high. Both effects increase with the policy field's closeness to science. These findings could be very relevant in order to understand how attributes of policy fields shape political institutions.

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Section: Res U Ltsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight

Bundi

2017

Governance

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“…However, previous studies did not scrutinise whether the linkages between MPs and interest groups matter for legislative co-sponsorship. This study fills a gap by focusing on a specific legislative behaviour that can be observed directly and, thus, avoiding the methodological bias of MPs misreporting (Bundi et al 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How MPs ties to interest groups matter for legislative co-sponsorship

et al. 2019

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This article investigates whether linkages between members of parliament (MPs) and interest groups matter for MPs' activities of co-sponsoring legislative proposals. Based on statistical models for network data, the study builds on classical explanations of cosponsorships highlighting the role of similar ties between MPs, such as party membership, legislative committee assignments, electoral district or gender. It shows that, on top of these traditional forms of homophily, MPs' ties to interest groups also make a difference. MPs with ties to a similar type of interest groups are more likely to co-sponsor their respective proposals. The same holds for MPs with ties to groups active in the same policy domain. These findings have implications for the study of groups' lobbying, legislative behaviour and representative democracy.

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“…Furthermore, when groups deliver policy-relevant information, they target parties which share their ideological preferences and policy positions. Linkages are established between likeminded groups and MPs (Hall and Deardorff, 2006:75): business groups predominantly support the legislative activities of MPs belonging to right parties, while public interest groups primarily help MPs from left parties to design workable policies (Otjes and Rasmussen, 2015;Gava et al 2016;Wonka 2017). The present study contributes to this literature by looking more deeply at the impact of MP-grous links on parliamentary evaluation practice.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…seating in a group's board) with interest groups. The register of interests is a rich source of observational data showing that the average number of interest ties per MP has more than doubled over the last decade, from 3.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2011 (Gava et al 2016). In sum, the Swiss parliament offers an ideal setting for investigating the influence of interest group advocacy on MPs' evaluations requests.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy evaluation in parliament: interest groups as catalysts

Varone

Bundi

Gava

2018

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Members of Parliament (MPs) request policy evaluations and use the resultant findings to inform law-making and hold the government to account. Since most elected representatives have developed strong ties to interest groups, one might wonder whether these privileged relationships influence MPs' parliamentary behavior. This study investigates how MPs' affiliations to groups affects their demand for policy evaluations. Empirical evidence shows that, regardless of respective party or individual characteristics, MPs are more likely to request evaluations in those policy domains where they have a group affiliation. This effect holds even when controlling for a classical measure of MP policy specialization, such as legislative committee membership. These findings suggest that ties between MPs and specific types of interest group should be considered when explaining parliamentary behavior across different policy domains. Point for practitioners: To influence the policymaking process, interest groups participate in consultation procedures and parliamentary hearings, they lobby elected officials and deliver policy expertise to decision-makers. These advocacy strategies are well studied. This article innovates by showing that, in addition, interest groups foster 3 the development of policy evaluations. MPs affiliated to an interest group active on a specific issue are likely to request policy evaluations in that policy domain. Interest groups strengthen the parliamentary demand for evaluation studies and, thus, may potentially contribute to the accountability of government and public administration.

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Self-Selection and Misreporting in Legislative Surveys

Cited by 23 publications

References 57 publications

Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight

Varieties of accountability: How attributes of policy fields shape parliamentary oversight

How MPs ties to interest groups matter for legislative co-sponsorship

Policy evaluation in parliament: interest groups as catalysts

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