Self-Selection in School Choice

Chen, Li; Pereyra, Juan Sebastián

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2880182

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The top-choice object is identical for all subjects in a group while the second-best is only identical for half of the group. This misrepresentation behavior is consistent with the self-selection explanation of Chen and Pereyra (2016) that subjects rank an object lower if the perceived chance of receiving it is very low.…”

supporting

confidence: 86%

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Schmelzer

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper compares two prominent stochastic assignment mechanisms in the laboratory: Random serial dictatorship (RSD) and top trading cycles with random endowments (TTC). In standard theory, both mechanisms are strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient for the house allocation problem without endowments. In the experiment, RSD outperforms TTC. This can be attributed to more dominant strategy play under RSD. The behavioral theory of obvious strategy-proofness can partly explain this difference in dominant strategy play. Generally, subjects with extremely high and low levels of contingent reasoning play their dominant strategies. These results suggest that one strategy-proof mechanism may outperform another one if individuals are boundedly rational. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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supporting

confidence: 86%

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Schmelzer

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…Liu et al (2014) showed that the set of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information is non-empty and under which conditions such a matching is also efficient. The consequences of incomplete information to a stable mechanism where theoretically introduced by Ehlers and Massó (2015) and empirically by Chen and Pereyra (2015). Nevertheless, there is still missing work on what is happening to an unstable matching mechanism which is not strategy-proof.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse

Hoyer

Stroh-Maraun

2020

Games and Economic Behavior

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In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.

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