Semantic and Causal Relations Between the Conspiracy Mentality and Belief in Conspiracy Theories

Abstract

Four pre-registered studies examined the semantic and causal relation between conspiracy mentality and belief in conspiracy theories. Study 1 ( N = 251) confirmed important differences between these two constructs. Participants perceived conspiracy mentality propositions as general rules and conspiracy theories as specific examples. This perception that conspiracy mentality statements are more general was associated with the perception that they are more plausible and, if shared, less likely to cause dispute and to stigmatize the communicator. Conceptualizing them as different constructs, Studies 2–4 together indicate that they might have a bidirectional causal relationship with each other. Affirming conspiracy theories set in real-world and fictional societies increased participants’ conspiracy mentality scores, relative to negations of conspiracy theories (Studies 2, 3) and a baseline condition (Study 4). Conversely, affirming conspiracy mentality statements increased participants’ endorsement of conspiracy theories (Study 4). The semantic relation between the two constructs means each may reinforce the other through inductive and deductive reasoning. Nonetheless, important social-psychological differences may emerge between them due to the greater specificity and epistemic riskiness of conspiracy theories compared to the conspiracy mentality.

Conspiracy Mentality Versus Belief in Conspiracy Theories

“…Therefore, the conspiracy mentality should be regarded as a hypothetical cause. We also agree with Nera (2024, this issue) that any causal relationship may be bidirectional: the conspiracy mentality may be an effect as well as a cause of belief in conspiracy theories (for longitudinal confirmation of this, see Granados Samayoa et al, 2022; for experimental confirmation, see Trella et al, 2024, this issue). This speaks against the conspiracy mentality as the sole or dominant driver of belief in conspiracy theories and suggests instead more complex, nuanced relationships.…”

“…This would allow empirical exploration of the hypothesis that the latter distrust might be a heuristic aid to democratic processes by encouraging people to be suspicious of what powerful interests are doing and what they are being told (e.g., Briggs, 2004; Enders & Smallpage, 2018; Huntington, 1983; Sobo, 2021). Some promising divergences between the CMQ and measures such as the BCTI are indeed already being observed in meta-analysis (Stasielowicz, 2022), and in the small number of studies that run them both at the same time using covariance analysis (e.g., Pan et al, 2023; for review, see Trella et al, 2024, this issue). Toward these aims, informed by Nera’s (2024, this issue) critique and our elaboration, we recommend that researchers:Elaborate the conspiracy mentality construct theoretically and validate it empirically.Do not use the use the conspiracy mentality terminology or scale when studying belief in conspiracy theories.…”

“…In these networks, associations grow over time between mutually coherent beliefs – including conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Williams et al, 2022), and potentially, more abstract conspiracy mentality propositions (Sutton & Douglas, 2014; Wood et al, 2012). Second, people may follow normative reasoning processes, including induction and deduction , to infer one type of conspiracy representation from the other (Trella et al, 2024, this issue). Third, the semantic similarity between conspiracy mentality propositions (e.g., CMQ items) and conspiracy theories (e.g., BCTI items) means that similar cognitive operations are required to process them.…”

Still Very Much Dead and Alive: Re-reconsidering Belief in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories

“…The incoherence stemming from Princess Diana being both dead and alive (indicated with red arrows) is resolved by both CTs being coherent with the higher-order idea that something must be wrong (indicated with green arrows). The support for Diana being dead is provided by the alternative theory that she faked her death via the reinforcement of the conspiratorial mindset (Trella, Sutton, & Douglas, 2024), which provides a set of assumptions (or prior beliefs, Rigoli, 2022) to endorse any kind of unrelated and/or fictitious CTs (e.g., Goertzel, 1994;Swami et al, 2011, marked with orange dashed arrows).…”