Abstract:Semantic normativism, which is the view that semantic properties/concepts are some kind of normative properties/concepts, has become increasingly influential in contemporary meta-semantics. In this paper, I aim to argue that semantic normativism has difficulty accommodating the causal efficacy of semantic properties. In specific, I raise an exclusion problem for semantic normativism, inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, I attempt to show that the exclusion problem for semantic… Show more
“…Moreover, §3 amounted to a discussion on the view that physical causal completeness requires only that p is a sufficient cause of p *, where p was not even a cause of p *, which clearly shows how deeply entrenched the requirement that some p is a sufficient cause of p * is. And, as evident from the following brief sample of recent articulations of the principle, physical causal completeness qua sufficient physical cause condition is commonly embraced: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (White , 1779).If an instance of a physical property has a cause that occurs at t , it has a (sufficient) physical cause that occurs at t (Zhong , 632).… every physical property has a sufficient physical cause (Gebharter , 356).The common understanding of the principle of physical causal completeness is that some p must be a sufficient physical cause of p *. So, any model that merely establishes that p is a cause of p * without establishing (ii), that p is a sufficient cause of p *, does not establish robust physical causal completeness.…”
Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If an instance of a physical property has a cause that occurs at t , it has a (sufficient) physical cause that occurs at t (Zhong , 632).…”
Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
“…Moreover, §3 amounted to a discussion on the view that physical causal completeness requires only that p is a sufficient cause of p *, where p was not even a cause of p *, which clearly shows how deeply entrenched the requirement that some p is a sufficient cause of p * is. And, as evident from the following brief sample of recent articulations of the principle, physical causal completeness qua sufficient physical cause condition is commonly embraced: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (White , 1779).If an instance of a physical property has a cause that occurs at t , it has a (sufficient) physical cause that occurs at t (Zhong , 632).… every physical property has a sufficient physical cause (Gebharter , 356).The common understanding of the principle of physical causal completeness is that some p must be a sufficient physical cause of p *. So, any model that merely establishes that p is a cause of p * without establishing (ii), that p is a sufficient cause of p *, does not establish robust physical causal completeness.…”
Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If an instance of a physical property has a cause that occurs at t , it has a (sufficient) physical cause that occurs at t (Zhong , 632).…”
Section: Counterfactual Models and Completenessmentioning
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
“…After all, the counterfactual ‘Had m without p occurred, p* would have occurred’ is false, since the nearest possible world where m without p occurs is a world where p* does not occur, indicating that the presence of m alone does not guarantee that p* occurs (cp. Zhong forthcoming, 10). This point is problematic for those who argue that the mental cause is a sufficient cause.…”
According to proponents of the causal exclusion problem, there cannot be a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause of the same piece of behaviour. Increasingly, the causal exclusion problem is circumvented via this compatibilist reasoning: a sufficient physical cause of the behavioural effect necessitates the mental cause of the behavioural effect, so the effect has a sufficient physical cause and a mental cause as well. In this paper, I argue that this compatibilist reply fails to resolve the causal exclusion problem.
“…This is already a telling case, as it suggests that unlike classical phenomenal inversion, where differences in qualia structure are conceivably consistent with physical and behavioral indiscernibility(Shoemaker 1982;Block 1990), the inversion of semantic properties seems to carry along non-semantic discernibility.11 Zhong (2017) makes a similar move against semantic normativism. He argues that semantic normativism has difficulties accommodating the causal efficacy of semantic properties, and raises an exclusion problem for semantic norms inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind.…”
It is common belief that semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties: no two possible worlds can be non-semantic duplicates and fail to be semantic duplicates. The view enjoys somewhat of an orthodoxy status in contemporary philosophy of language and metaphysics, and is often assumed without argument. Yet, work by Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor has claimed that it is vulnerable to a variant of the classical arguments against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical. This paper does three things: it clarifies what semantic supervenience is about, it responds to the objections that have been leveled against it, and provides a new battery of arguments in its favor. I argue that the thesis of semantic supervenience is safe from classical anti-supervenience arguments, and show that its rejection generates unwelcome consequences. I conclude that there are substantial reasons to embrace the received wisdom: semantic properties supervene.
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