SemperFi: Anti-spoofing GPS Receiver for UAVs

Sathaye, Harshad; LaMountain, Gerald; Closas, Pau; Ranganathan, Aanjhan

doi:10.14722/ndss.2022.23071

Cited by 22 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…In most studies, the concept of defending against these spoofing attacks corresponds mainly to detecting spoofing signals. Of course, the concept of defense can even be said to detect and receive legitimate signals [11]. This paper focuses on detection methods as a countermeasure to spoofing attacks.…”

Section: Backround a Gps Spoofing Attack And Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Currently, PX4 has a function that does not reflect the position observed by GPS if there is a difference between the position estimated by EKF (mainly using IMU) and the position observed by GPS above a certain level. Especially, the latest detecting methodology [11], [20], [21] directly used the EKF sensor fusion algorithm to detect spoofing attacks. The innovation test ratio which refers to the degree of difference between the measured sensor value and the estimated value can be a criterion in the spoofing detection and updated every sensor fusion.…”

Section: B Ekf Sensor Fusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this work, we classified attack models and proposed ways to increase the efficiency of detection for the attack models. Contrary to the complete control attack [21], the primary goal of the attack models in our work is to change only the final destination. We suppose UAVs move to a target position.…”

Section: Proposed Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This autopilot system consists of several modules which include control, estimation (EKF Sensor Fusion), communication, and so on. [5], [6], [11]- [13] have proposed methods to defend GPS spoofing by experimenting with PX4. However, attack models and methods have not been systematically classified and proposed for PX4, and there was no in-depth analysis regarding the detection of GPS spoofing attacks using EKF sensor fusion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Analysis of GPS Spoofing Attack and Efficient Approach to Spoofing Detection in PX4

Jung,

Hong,

Choi

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are aerial vehicles that can go to a particular position without human control or with remote human control. It is because unmanned control mainly relies on position estimation that a lot of research has been studied on GPS spoofing attacks. Detection methods against GPS spoofing attacks mainly include monitoring RF signals or IMU sensor values inside UAVs. In this work, we analyze GPS attack and detection in an advanced autopilot system, PX4 without excluding RF detection. Recent studies have shown that GPS spoofing is unable to evade the detection using EKF sensor fusion. Therefore, this paper experiment whether the detection could be evaded by strengthening the attacker model. This paper classifies attacker models according to whether an attacker knows the true position of UAVs or the estimated position by UAV and proposed attack methods depending on each model in PX4. We inject GPS value which our attack method intends to UAV during mission flight in simulation environment. By manipulating the GPS driver code of PX4 controller, we inject GPS value the attack method wants into UAV in physical environment. Finally, we observed the innovation test ratio during GPS spoofing and demonstrate that GPS spoofing attack is possible keeping the innovation test ratio under the anomaly detection criterion. After that, we proposed our approach which scales the EKF's Kalman gain randomly to increase the detection method's efficiency and experiment with the attack methods. This detection method has little effect on the test ratio without the attack. But during the attack, the innovation test ratio was increased higher than the anomaly detection criterion so that the attack could be detected.

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Section: Backround a Gps Spoofing Attack And Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Ekf Sensor Fusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proposed Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Analysis of GPS Spoofing Attack and Efficient Approach to Spoofing Detection in PX4

Jung,

Hong,

Choi

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

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“…The main disadvantage of the proposed method is the requirement to provide the parameter values for each user, which may be a barrier to a consumer without this capability. Another study proposed SemperFi [ 12 ], a single antenna GPS receiver capable of tracking legitimate GPS satellite signals and estimating the drone’s true location (even during a spoofing attack); this method relies on a comparison of satellite signals’ time of arrival (ToA) in order to determine whether a GPS spoofing attack occurred. This solution’s main disadvantage is that the consumer is dependent on the manufacturer, which is responsible for the solution’s implementation, and cannot implement the solution him/herself.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards the Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks against Drones by Analyzing Camera’s Video Stream

Davidovich

Nassi

Elovici

2022

Sensors

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A Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attack can be launched against any commercial GPS sensor in order to interfere with its navigation capabilities. These sensors are installed in a variety of devices and vehicles (e.g., cars, planes, cell phones, ships, UAVs, and more). In this study, we focus on micro UAVs (drones) for several reasons: (1) they are small and inexpensive, (2) they rely on a built-in camera, (3) they use GPS sensors, and (4) it is difficult to add external components to micro UAVs. We propose an innovative method, based on the video stream captured by a drone’s camera, for the real-time detection of GPS spoofing attacks targeting drones. The proposed method collects frames from the video stream and their location (GPS coordinates); by calculating the correlation between each frame, our method can detect GPS spoofing attacks on drones. We first analyze the performance of the suggested method in a controlled environment by conducting experiments on a flight simulator that we developed. Then, we analyze its performance in the real world using a DJI drone. Our method can provide different levels of security against GPS spoofing attacks, depending on the detection interval required; for example, it can provide a high level of security to a drone flying at altitudes of 50–100 m over an urban area at an average speed of 4 km/h in conditions of low ambient light; in this scenario, the proposed method can provide a level of security that detects any GPS spoofing attack in which the spoofed location is a distance of 1–4 m (an average of 2.5 m) from the real location.

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