The last decade has seen substantial progress on designing Byzantine agreement algorithms which are scalable in that they do not require all-to-all communication among nodes. These protocols require each node to play a particular role determined by its ID, and to send to specific neighbors. Motivated, in part, by the rise of permissionless systems such as Bitcoin where arbitrary nodes (whose identities are not known apriori) can join and leave at will, we extend this research to a more practical model where each node (initially) does not know the identity of its neighbors. In particular, a node can send to new destinations only by sending to random (or arbitrary) nodes, or responding (if it chooses) to messages received from those destinations. We assume a synchronous and fully-connected network, with a fullinformation, but static Byzantine adversary. A general drawback of existing Byzantine protocols is that the communication cost incurred by the honest nodes may not be proportional to those incurred by the Byzantine nodes; in fact, they can be significantly higher. Our goal is to design Byzantine protocols for fundamental problems which are resource competitive, i.e., the total number of bits sent by all the honest nodes is not significantly more than those sent by the Byzantine nodes.We describe a randomized scalable algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement, leader election, and committee election in this model. Our algorithm sends an expected O((T + n) log n) bits and has latency O(polylog(n)), where n is the number of nodes, and T is the minimum of n 2 and the number of bits sent by adversarially controlled nodes. The algorithm is resilient to (1/4 − )n Byzantine nodes for any fixed > 0, and succeeds with high probability 1 . Our work can be considered as a first application of resource-competitive analysis to fundamental Byzantine problems.To complement our algorithm we also show lower bounds for resource-competitive Byzantine agreement. We prove that, in general, one cannot hope to design Byzantine protocols that have communication cost that is significantly smaller than the cost of the Byzantine adversary.