Sending money home in times of crime: the case of Mexico

Abstract

We explore at the municipality level how the climate of criminal violence has affected the flow of remittances to Mexico. Using a panel of municipalities in the years 2006 and 2010, we find that drug-related crimes and overall rates of homicides have reduced the percentage of families that receive remittances. This result is robust to controlling for net migration, political variables, and traditional socioeconomic explanations of remittance sending. It is also robust to potential threats to validity. We interpret this result as suggestive of self-interested concerns when sending money home amidst a climate of rampant violence. Nonetheless, mixed motivations to remit are evident in our analysis.

The 3×1 Programme and criminal violence in Mexico

“…Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the causality between participation in the 3×1 Programme and violence levels in a municipality may run in both directions -that is, poor security conditions may affect participation in this programme (Duquette-Rury 2016). In line with the findings by Meseguer et al (2017), newspaper evidence suggests that various HTAs have stopped (or else postponed) their 3×1 investments because of the rising levels of criminal violence in the municipalities concerned (Martínez Brooks 2014). Also, recent work by Pérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury (forthcoming) shows that participation in the 3×1 Programme increases the probability that self-defence militias will emerge in a municipality.…”

“…Recent work by Meseguer et al (2017) shows that criminal violence has a negative effect on the private transfers that Mexican emigrants make to their families. This is attributed to the emigrants' self-interested motives for sending remittances to violenceridden contexts.…”

“…An alternative, yet related, reason why the 3×1 Programme may contribute towards reducing levels of criminal violence in the municipalities in which it operates has to do with the emigrants' interest in protecting the value of their investments. Recent research suggests that criminal violence may affect the value or expected returns of emigrant investments in the communities of origin (Jaitman 2015;Meseguer et al 2017). By guiding investments, emigrant clubs can send a clear message to state authorities that they will not continue to invest in the 3×1 Programme if corruption and crime are tolerated.…”

Migrant transnationalism in violent democracies

“…The political characteristics of receiving countries certainly condition the degree to which migrants engage their origin-country politics in ways that contribute to strengthening democracy (Careja and Emmenegger 2012). Yet, as a growing number of scholars show, transnational modes of engagement and their political consequences are shaped not only by receiving country experiences, but also by the characteristics of politics in the sending-country (Ahmadov and Sasse 2016;Easton and Montinola 2017;Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017;Rother 2009;Tyburski 2014).…”

“…Some have begun to explore the degree to which violence motivates outmigration in Mexico and Central America (Hiskey, Malone, and Orces 2014;Ríos Contreras 2014;Chort and De La Rupelle 2016;Arceo-Gómez 2013). A series of articles on Mexico and Colombia show that violence reduces remittance transfers because migrants risk losing their money (Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017;Vargas-Silva 2009). And, Pérez-Arméndariz and Duquette-Rury (2019) show that enduring transnational practices can be repurposed in response ever more violent sending contexts and unresponsive leaders.…”