Sensitivity analysis of the vestigial signal defence‐based civil GNSS spoofing detection method

Abstract

The vestigial signal defense (VSD) method is widely used for detecting intermediate spoofing attacks via monitoring the vestigial signals within the receiver. It is popular and promising for two reasons. One is that it is one of the most effective methods against intermediate spoofing attacks unless the spoofer could suppress the authentic signals. The other is that it is easy to implement as it is totally softwaredefined and receiver-autonomous. Though VSD is promising, it can be vulnerable to spoofing signals with strong strength. Because the strong spoofing signals can significantly lift the receiver noise floor and reduce the vestigial signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) to below the SINR detection threshold, preventing the vestigial signal from being detected. To low-costly address this issue, this paper firstly investigates the effect of spoofing strength on the availability of VSD on the basis of vestigial SINR model. Then, the improvement scheme is proposed based on the investigation, which is low-cost but effective. As shown by the rigorous analysis, the noise floor would be considerably increased and the vestigial SINR would fall below the SINR detection threshold, even when the spoofing signals are not much stronger. However, if the receiver is able to extend integration time and roughly estimate the noise floor, the VSD can be more robust to much stronger spoofing signals.

A Survey on Coping With Intentional Interference in Satellite Navigation for Manned and Unmanned Aircraft

“…2) Multi-Correlator Banks [136]- [139]: The apparent similarity of a counterfeit signal with a signal replica generated by a multipath reflection is the reason for the adaptation of multipath mitigation techniques, such as multi-correlator banks to spoofing detection and monitoring. Examples of multicorrelator bank-based algorithms include the multiple tracking loops proposed in [137], the Spoofing Estimating Delay Lock Loop (SEDLL) [136] or the vector tracking loops investigated in [138].…”

“…Probability of false alarm: the probability of raising an interference alarm when no interferer is active, which must be kept below a target limit to guarantee system availability above a minimum level of quality of service (P fa , e.g., used in [139], [249]- [251], see Eq. ( 16));…”

Prediction‐discrepancy based on innovative particle filter for estimating UAV true position in the presence of the GPS spoofing attacks

“…The traditional solution for positioning process in UAVs in the condition of the GPS spoofing attack is to detect the GPS spoofing [13] and using the back‐up systems such as Loran‐C or INS/Loran‐C. In this case, the accuracy of positioning solution is approximately equal to the accuracy of the Loran‐C system that is about 100 m or more [14].…”

Adaptive Spoofing Suppression Algorithm for GNSS Based on Multiple Antennas Array

“…However, the performance of this algorithm may deteriorate when the code phase differences between authentic signals and spoofing signals are <1.5 chips and the Doppler frequency differences between authentic signals and spoofing signals are relatively small. Sensitivity models have been formulated that include a vestigial signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR) that is quantified and characterized to detect the probability of a false alarm [13].…”