Sensitivity has Multiple Heterogeneity Problems: a Reply to Wallbridge

Abstract

In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia (2016b). I argue in (Melchior in Episteme, 12(4), 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge’s account raises a further problem of this kind.

Précis on Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation

“…For the view that the crucial higher-level beliefs are sensitive, see Becker (2006 and2007) and Salerno (2010), and for the view that the (in)sensitivity of higherlevel beliefs delivers a picture too heterogeneous to be plausible, see Melchior (2015). For an objection against this view and a reply, see Wallbridge (2017) and Melchior (2018).…”

Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

“…11 For a reply to Melchior's problem, see Wallbridge 2016b, and for a reply to Wallbridge's reply, see Melchior (2017).…”