Sensitivity tests of biological safety cabinets' contaminant contention to variations on indoor flow parameters in biosafety level laboratories

Barbosa, Bruno Perazzo Pedroso; Brum, Nisio de Carvalho Lobo

doi:10.1016/j.buildenv.2017.07.034

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…1(c)). Each piece of equipment was represented by a rectangular box, which is the general shape of autoclaves, centrifuges, freezers, incubators, and most biological laboratory equipment [16]. The locations of sampling points S1, S2, S3 and S4 are shown in Fig.…”

Section: Physical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some researchers have even employed visualization and CFD technology to investigate the risk of exposure to infections in the laboratory. Barbosa et al [16] numerically simulated the contaminant contention of a biological safety cabinet (BSC) with different indoor parameters (e.g. inflow velocity, air exchange rate, and room thermal load), and found that increasing the indoor ventilation rate may reduce the control effect of the BSC on pollutants, therefore increasing the risk of exposure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Experimental and numerical study of potential infection risks from exposure to bioaerosols in one BSL-3 laboratory

Liu

Zhuang

et al. 2020

Building and Environment

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Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are defined as infections of laboratory staff by exposure to pathogenic microorganisms during an experimental procedure. For a biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratory with a high potential of exposure, reducing risks and threats relevant to LAIs has become a critical concern, especially after the recent outbreak of Novel Coronavirus causing COVID-19 in Wuhan, China. This study aimed to investigate the spatial-temporal characteristics of bioaerosol dispersion and deposition of two kinds of bioaerosols (Serratia marcescens and phage ΦX174). A combination of laboratory experiment and numerical simulation was adopted to explore bioaerosol removal. Three-dimensional concentration iso-surface mapping in conjunction with flow field analysis was employed to elucidate bioaerosol migration and deposition behavior. The total deposition number and unit area deposition ratio were calculated for different surfaces. The results indicate that bioaerosol concentration remains stable for up to 400 s after release, and that almost 70% of all bioaerosol particles become deposited on the surfaces of walls and equipment. Vortex flow regions and high-concentration regions were determined, and the most severely contaminated surfaces and locations were identified. Our results could provide the scientific basis for controlling the time interval between different experiments and also provide guidelines for a laboratory disinfection routine. Furthermore, future work regarding laboratory layout optimization and high efficiency air distribution for bioaerosol removal in a BSL-3 laboratory should be emphasized.

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Section: Physical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental and numerical study of potential infection risks from exposure to bioaerosols in one BSL-3 laboratory

Liu

Zhuang

et al. 2020

Building and Environment

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“…Biosafety laboratories have a set of preventive measures required for handling dangerous biological agents in a safe [8], reliable, and closed environment, and is the main location for studying unknown microbes [9]. However, in the course of the research, due to accidents or the carelessness of operators [10], highly contagious microbes will spread to the surrounding environment in the form of aerosols [11], presenting a large exposure risk to researchers. Research has shown that 86.6% of operations can cause both microbe aerosols and unexplained laboratory infections that may be caused by the diffusion of microbe aerosols in the air, according to 276 types of operational testing in laboratories.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Experimental Common High-Risk Procedures: Emission Characteristics Identification and Source Intensity Estimation in Biosafety Laboratory

Liu

Zhang

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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Biosafety laboratory is an important place to study high-risk microbes. In biosafety laboratories, with the outbreak of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, experimental activities have become increasingly frequent, and the risk of exposure to bioaerosols has increased. To explore the exposure risk of biosafety laboratories, the intensity and emission characteristics of laboratory risk factors were investigated. In this study, high-risk microbe samples were substituted with Serratia marcescens as the model bacteria. The resulting concentration and particle size segregation of the bioaerosol produced by three experimental procedures (spill, injection, and sample drop) were monitored, and the emission sources’ intensity were quantitatively analyzed. The results showed that the aerosol concentration produced by injection and sample drop was 103 CFU/m3, and that by sample spill was 102 CFU/m3. The particle size of bioaerosol is mainly segregated in the range of 3.3–4.7 μm. There are significant differences in the influence of risk factors on source intensity. The intensity of sample spill, injection, and sample drop source is 3.6 CFU/s, 78.2 CFU/s, and 664 CFU/s. This study could provide suggestions for risk assessment of experimental operation procedures and experimental personnel protection.

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“…The mobile BSL-4 laboratory can go to the epidemic areas to detect the pathogenic bioaerosol when a major outbreak of severe infectious disease occurs, avoiding the transfer of dangerous infection samples midway and reducing the diffusion risk of virus, while ensuring highly infectious pollutants (such as novel coronavirus) were discharged safely (Huang et al 2020). Bioaerosols produced by experimental operations are the main possible sources of laboratory-acquired infections, viruses and bacteria in aerosols can live for hours or even years (Wang et al 2012;Perazzo et al 2017), the exposure risk of pollutants is the most common (Lai and Nazaroff 2000;Li et al 2019) and the reasonable diffusion mode and appropriate deposition rate of bioaerosol particles are conducive to reducing the possibility of potential exposure risk of bioaerosols (King et al 2013;Cheng et al 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Honda et al (2004) used ultrasonic anemometer to analyze the dynamic characteristics of airflow caused by the opening and closing of clean room and found that no matter there is an in-opening door or out-opening door, it will both cause local strong countercurrent, which improves the possibility of cross contact of suspended particles between indoor and outdoor. Barbosa et al (2017) found that the bioaerosol produced by laboratory operation is the source of LAIs. The CFD simulation results showed that the movement characteristics of pollutant particles in BSC are related to the airflow pattern, inflow velocity and indoor turbulence degree in the biological laboratory, and the enhancement of turbulence level increases the possibility of workers being exposed to pollutants.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on contaminant distribution in a mobile BSL-4 laboratory based on multi-region directional airflow

Wang

Miao

Chen

et al. 2021

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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The outbreak of COVID-19 has caused increasing public attention to laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs), especially for a mobile Bio-Safety Level 4 Lab (BSL-4) with high potential of exposure. In this paper, the distribution and removal mechanism of bioaerosols in the biosafety laboratory were studied. A simulation model of airflow distribution in the opening and closing state of air-tight door was established and verified. The results showed that the airflow entrainment velocity during the opening of the door was approximately 0.12 m/s. It increased the probability of vortex generation in the laboratory. The deposition rate of particles was doubled when the air-tight door opening is compared with air-tight door closing. Besides, nearly 80% of the particles deposited on the surface of the wall and ceiling, increasing the possibility of LAIs. The findings of this paper could provide new scientific methods for high-level biosafety laboratories to avoid cross-infection. Moreover, future work regarding air-tight door rotation speed regulation and control should be emphasized.Keywords Laboratory-acquired infections . Mobile Bio-Safety Level 4 Lab . Removal mechanism . Airflow distribution . Bioaerosols . Entrainment velocity Highlights• This study was conducted based on a mobile BSL-4 laboratory.• The mechanism of bioaerosol diffusion between multi-region was analyzed.• Entrainment velocity altered the locations of high concentration zones of bioaerosols.• Opening or closing of airtight doors raises the possibility of cross-infection.• The mode of interaction between airflow and bioaerosols was explored.

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Sensitivity tests of biological safety cabinets' contaminant contention to variations on indoor flow parameters in biosafety level laboratories

Cited by 11 publications

References 22 publications

Experimental and numerical study of potential infection risks from exposure to bioaerosols in one BSL-3 laboratory

Experimental and numerical study of potential infection risks from exposure to bioaerosols in one BSL-3 laboratory

Three Experimental Common High-Risk Procedures: Emission Characteristics Identification and Source Intensity Estimation in Biosafety Laboratory

Study on contaminant distribution in a mobile BSL-4 laboratory based on multi-region directional airflow

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