It has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure; while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. However, the argument fails to take the method-relativity of the modal conditions on knowledge, viz, sensitivity and safety, into account. In this paper, I argue that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure once the method-relativity of the modal conditions is taken into account. Therefore, epistemic closure is no longer an arbiter in the debate.
KeywordsBelief-formation methods • Competent deduction • Epistemic closure • Inferential beliefs • Knowledge • Safety • Sensitivity • The generality problem sensitivity account of knowledge 1 and the safety account of knowledge 2 .Though both accounts handle a wide range of cases involving knowledge-precluding epistemic luck as well as cases of knowledge, 3 it has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure; while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. In this paper, I demonstrate that such an argument fails to take into account that the modal conditions are usually relativized to belief-formation methods. Once we take the method-relativity of the modal conditions into account, it should be clear to us that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure, viz., either both accounts preserve epistemic closure or both accounts imply epistemic closure failure. Therefore, epistemic closure cannot be used to adjudicate between the sensitivity and the safety accounts of knowledge. 4