Sensorimotor conflicts alter metacognitive and action monitoring

Faivre, Nathan; Vuillaume, Laurène; Bernasconi, Fosco; Salomon, Roy; Blanke, Olaf; Cleeremans, Axel

doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2019.12.001

Cited by 33 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…In a factorial design, we also tested for the effect of continuous report paired to stimulus presentation on confidence judgements. Over conditions with and without first-order 2AFC responses (both R+ and R-), we found a consistent increase in confidence following continuous report (CR+ vs. CR-) , as well as the existence of sub-threshold motor activity (Gajdos et al, 2019), differences in movement parameters (Faivre et al, 2019) or voluntary control (Charles et al, 2019). Our study adds a novel kind of manipulation, namely the occurrence of motor responses, to the list of experimental manipulations that affect confidence but not first-order accuracy.…”

Section: Effect Of Continuous Report On Confidence Ratingsmentioning

confidence: 53%

“…Beyond behaviour alone, Gajdos et al (2019) showed that confidence increases in the presence of sub-threshold motor activity prior to first-order responses. Plus, we recently showed that alpha-desynchronization prior to first-order response (an electrophysiological signature of motor preparation) correlates with confidence over different perceptual tasks (Faivre et al, 2017), that metacognitive performance for decisions that are committed with a keypress is better than that to equivalent decisions that are observed (Pereira et al, 2018), and that sensorimotor conflicts alter confidence (Faivre et al, 2019). Finally, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) directed at the premotor cortex involved in the first-order response was found to affect confidence ratings, suggesting a causal role of action-related signals for confidence (Fleming et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Response-Related Signals Increase Confidence But Not Metacognitive Performance

Filevich

Koß

Faivre

2020

eNeuro

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Confidence judgements are a central tool in metacognition research. In a typical task, participants first perform perceptual (first-order) decisions and then rate their confidence in these decisions. The relationship between confidence and first-order accuracy is taken as a measure of metacognitive performance. Confidence is often assumed to stem from decision-monitoring processes alone, but processes that co-occur with the first-order decision may also play a role in confidence formation. In fact, some recent studies have revealed that directly manipulating motor regions in the brain, or the time of first-order decisions relative to second-order ones affects confidence judgements. This finding suggests that confidence could be informed by a readout of reaction times in addition to decision-monitoring processes. To test this possibility, we assessed the contribution of response-related signals to confidence and, in particular, to metacognitive performance (i.e., a measure of the adequacy of these confidence judgements). In human volunteers, we measured the effect of making an overt (vs. covert) decision, as well as the effect of pairing an action to the stimulus about which the first-order decision is made. Against our expectations, we found no differences in overall confidence or metacognitive performance when first-order responses were covert as opposed to overt. Further, actions paired to visual stimuli presented led to higher confidence ratings, but did not affect metacognitive performance. These results suggest that confidence ratings do not always incorporate motor information. 4 Significance statement To measure metacognition, or the ability to monitor one s own thoughts, experimental tasks often require human volunteers to, first, make a perceptual decision (first-order task") and, then, rate their confidence in their own decision (second-order task"). In this paradigm, both first and second-order information could, in principle, influence confidence judgements. But only the latter is truly metacognitive. To determine whether confidence is a valid metacognitive measure, we compared confidence ratings between two conditions: with overt responses, where participants provided both first-and second-order responses; and with covert responses where participants reported their confidence in a decision that they had not executed. Removing first-order decisions did not affect confidence, which validates confidence as an introspective measure.

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Section: Effect Of Continuous Report On Confidence Ratingsmentioning

confidence: 53%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Response-Related Signals Increase Confidence But Not Metacognitive Performance

Filevich

Koß

Faivre

2020

eNeuro

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“…More generally, our theory suggests that failures of the ego-centric system would render the perceptual system more susceptible to false percepts and hallucinations. Interestingly, recent work suggests that sensorimotor conflicts induced by a robotic system decrease the capacity to adapt confidence to task performance (metacognitive failure), increase intentional binding (potentially due to an enhanced JoA) (Faivre et al, 2020) and generate a feeling of presence (Blanke et al, 2014).…”

Section: Explanatory Power and Novel Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Embodied Predictions, Agency, and Psychosis

Leptourgos

Corlett

2020

Front. Big Data

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Psychotic symptoms, i.e., hallucinations and delusions, involve gross departures from conscious apprehension of consensual reality; respectively, perceiving and believing things that, according to same culture peers, do not obtain. In schizophrenia, those experiences are often related to abnormal sense of control over one's own actions, often expressed as a distorted sense of agency (i.e., passivity symptoms). Cognitive and computational neuroscience have furnished an account of these experiences and beliefs in terms of the brain's generative model of the world, which underwrites inferences to the best explanation of current and future states, in order to behave adaptively. Inference then involves a reliability-based trade off of predictions and prediction errors, and psychotic symptoms may arise as departures from this inference process, either an over-or under-weighting of priors relative to prediction errors. Surprisingly, there is empirical evidence in favor of both positions. Relatedly, there is evidence for both an enhanced and a diminished sense of agency in schizophrenia. How can this be? We argue that there is more than one generative model in the brain, and that ego-and allo-centric models operate in tandem. In brief, ego-centric models implement corollary discharge signals that cancel out the effects of self-generated actions while allo-centric models compare several hypothesis regarding the causes of sensory inputs (including the self among the potential causes). The two parallel hierarchies give rise to different levels of agency, with ego-centric models subserving "feelings of agency" and allo-centric predictions giving rise to "judgements of agency." Those two components are weighted according to their reliability and combined, generating a higher-level "sense of agency." We suggest that in schizophrenia a failure of corollary discharges to suppress self-generated inputs results in the absence of a "feeling of agency" and in a compensatory enhancement of allo-centric priors, which might underlie hallucinations, delusions of control but also, under certain circumstances, the enhancement of "judgments of agency." We discuss the consequences of such a model, and potential courses of action that could lead to its falsification.

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“…Participants' pokes were replicated by the back robot, thus applying corresponding touches on participants' backs. The touches were mediated by the robot either in synchronous (without delay) or asynchronous (with 500 milliseconds delay) fashion, creating different degrees of sensorimotor conflict between the upper limb movement and somatosensory feedback on the back (Blanke et al, 2014;Faivre et al, 2020;Salomon et al, 2020).…”

Section: Robotic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…induces an alteration of BSC characterized by differences in self-location (Blanke et al, 2014) and in selfmonitoring (Faivre et al, 2020). Importantly, these and related stimulations also induce the feeling that another person is in the room (Blanke et al, 2014;Salomon et al, 2020), a loss of self-agency (Sato & Yasuda, 2005;Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005), and somatic passivity (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Breathing affects self-other voice discrimination in a bodily state with increased otherness

Orepic¹,

Faivre²,

Rognini³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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A growing number of studies have focused on identifying cognitive processes that are modulated by interoceptive signals. Here we investigated whether interoception affects self-processing, by assessing changes in self-voice perception as a function of respiratory and cardiac cycles. Considering the fundamental role interoception plays in bodily self-consciousness, we additionally applied conflicting sensorimotor stimulation inducing a state characterized by a loss of self and increased otherness, and investigated its effects in self-other voice perception. Our data reveal that breathing, but not heartbeat, affects self-voice perception, by showing that participants (N = 30) discriminated self-voice from other voices better during inspiration, while being in the state of increased otherness and especially when hearing voices of other people. Loudness judgement of equivalent self-related stimuli was unaffected by breathing. Combining interoception and voice perception with self-monitoring framework, these data extend recent findings on breathing-dependent cognition to self-processing.

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Sensorimotor conflicts alter metacognitive and action monitoring

Cited by 33 publications

References 45 publications

Response-Related Signals Increase Confidence But Not Metacognitive Performance

Response-Related Signals Increase Confidence But Not Metacognitive Performance

Embodied Predictions, Agency, and Psychosis

Breathing affects self-other voice discrimination in a bodily state with increased otherness

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