In the preface to his work The Body and Social Theory 2 [Shilling, 2012], British sociologist Chris Shilling explains how, in recent decades, the human body has become a popular matter of interest thanks to the advance in transplant surgery, stem-cell research and reproductive technology, and the public disputations over neuroscience claims and radical bodily modifications. Then he asks, "[h]ave we lost or gained control over our bodily identities, properties and capacities?" [Shilling, 2012, p. ix]. It is a sharp question, because it prompts for a reflection on distinct yet interrelated notions. More specifically, what does control over one's bodily identity mean? Do we control our body properties, or are they controlled by the media that condition the body in the first place? In our physical interaction with technology, are our body capacities the object or the subject of the action? The answer lies in understanding human subjectivity and technological individuality as two sides of the same iterative process. Human beings create technological artefacts which influence the formation of human subjectivity. In turn, the shifting characterization of human subjectivity prompts new directions for technical development. It is a self-organizational feedback loop. From this viewpoint, we can move beyond the idea where identity is controlled, and embrace a notion where human subjectivity emerges through the configuration of human bodies with technological bodies. The term "configuration" will be used in this chapter to indicate not a