Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status: A Further Reply to Hsiao

Abstract

Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities grounded in one's nature, and his explanation of why cruelty is wrong. I also argue that sentience is a more plausible candidate for the morally salient capacity than rationality.

Consumer Moral Dilemma in the Choice of Animal-Friendly Meat Products

“…Therefore, if humans want to eat animals, they have the right to do so. In response, Bruers and others have lodged a number of objections against Hsiao's argument [63,64] by claiming that the sentience and well-being of creatures are in fact sufficient for moral standing and thus that all sentient beings deserve to be free from harm [65]. The debate continues among philosophers, without a conclusion (e.g., [62,66]).…”

What Do We Owe to Novel Synthetic Beings and How Can We Be Sure?

“…Moreover, if killing animals is impermissible because they display preferences that conduce to their flourishing, it may also be impermissible to kill many other living creatures 9 ; for example plants, 10 since these too display goal-directed behavior. The relation between mental sophistication and moral status is vulnerable to the charge of vagueness, however, 11 and I do not have a perfect answer to this challenge.…”