Separate memory laws for recall of performed acts?

Abstract

The present study was inspired by an experimental report by Cohen (1981). where recall of subject performed minitasks was demonstrated to give serial position curves without primacy effect. The question raised was whether this deviation implied the formulation of new memory laws. Eight new experiments were conducted. Two of them replicated Cohen's observations; one with concretely performed acts, and one with symbolically performed acts. A third experiment examined recall of proposed, nonperformed acts, with results similar to those found in the other minitask experiments. Four experiments studied the effect of visually imagining act performance, again with results which demonstrated the existence of interesting similarities between the different types of act recall. Several of the experiments explored the role of self‐involvement and task familiarity, and the last experiment was specially designed to test a task‐difficulty hypothesis. The results were discussed in terms of a representation‐system theory, a nonstrategic lack‐of‐rehearsal interpretation, and in terms of a general problem‐solving account. None of these theories were found, all observations taken together, to have been clearly supported or clearly disproved, and more evidence was therefore deemed necessary before new memory laws need to be postulated.

Encoding information for future action: Memory for to-be-performed tasks versus memory for to-be-recalled tasks

“…This effect has been attributed to the multimodal and contextually rich properties of SPTs, which promote the use of visual and motor encoding (see Backman & Nilsson, 1984). A similar memory advantage has been observed even when the tasks were performed symbolically, in a make-believe fashion, rather than concretely (e.g., Helstrup, 1986;Saltz & Dixon, 1982). Furthermore, similar to what was found in the present study, the effect of symbolic enactment appears to be due to a better encoding of the information during learning rather than to its mode of retrieval (Saltz & Dixon, 1982).…”

Memory for actions: Self-performed tasks and the reenactment effect

“…In the case of SPTs and EPTs, enactment at test recapitulates the encoding circumstances, whereas for VTs, test enactment does not. Second, this result is contrary to the view that actions are encoded predominantly in terms of verbal-semantic information (e.g., Helstrup, 1986;KormiNouri & Nilsson, 2001). Because test reenactment increases recognition accuracy, modality-specific information appears to have been encoded.…”

“…This implies that modality-specific information is encoded in memory for actions, in addition to verbalsemantic information (cf. Helstrup, 1986;). The present experimental paradigm may even underestimate the potency of reenactment, because the verbal and the enactment test conditions were intermixed.…”

Win some, lose some: Hypermnesia for actions reflects increased item-specific processing

“…The source of this "enactment" effect remains disputed, however. Although it is generally agreed that enactment adds itemspecific information to the "memory trace" (e.g., Backman, Nilsson, & Chalom, 1986;Helstrup, 1986;Nyberg, 1993;Saltz & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981;Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1989), the effect on relational processing is unclear.Item-specific processing is assumed to increase the distinctiveness of an item in memory by emphasizing features that discriminate a particular item from other items, whereas relational processing is assumed to increase the organization of items in memory by focusing on features that are shared and by encoding interitem associations (Hunt & Einstein, 1981). Some authors claim that the enactment effect is due to increased relational processing, as well as item-specific processing (e.g., Backman et al, 1986); others argue that the effect is due exclusively to increased item-specific processing (e.g., Engelkamp & Zimmer, 1994, 1996Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1989).…”

“…The source of this "enactment" effect remains disputed, however. Although it is generally agreed that enactment adds itemspecific information to the "memory trace" (e.g., Backman, Nilsson, & Chalom, 1986;Helstrup, 1986;Nyberg, 1993;Saltz & Donnenwerth-Nolan, 1981;Zimmer & Engelkamp, 1989), the effect on relational processing is unclear.…”