Sequential Auctions with Information About Future Goods

Zeithammer, Robert

doi:10.2139/ssrn.537863

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In addition, because v A (t) (v B (t); 0) implies that giving up Item A is always a good choice for Bidder t even though all other bidders bid 0 or do not submit their bids at the rst auction, it is assumed here that v A (t) > (v B (t); 0) holds for 8 t 2 [0; 1] in this paper. Inspired by Zeithammer [14], Proposition 1 gives necessary and su cient conditions of equilibrium bid b A (t).…”

Section: Equilibrium and Winnersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, Zeithammer [14] studied sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects, discussed the in uence of revealing future objects on auction e ciency and proved the existence of symmetric equilibriums and pure bidding strategies. Bayesian methods and the models used for processing a multi-dimensional continuous type in his paper inspired our studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A class Hotelling model for sequential auctions of close substitutes

Rao

Zhao

2018

Scientia Iranica

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Against the background of supply chains, this paper constructs a class Hotelling model to describe and explore sequential auctions of close substitutes with slightly more general associated valuations. In this generalized model, both close substitutes and bidders are hypothetically distributed at the interval [0; 1], types of bidders are continuous, and each bidder's valuations for close substitutes are not independent. Moreover, with the aid of this model, equilibriums are explored, and e ciencies of the auctions are analyzed under second-price sealed-bid auction formats. Further, considering two typical information policies, we investigate some concrete bids and revenues of the e cient sequential auctions, while bidders' valuations are linear functions of distances between them and close substitutes. Results show that e ciencies of the sequential auctions are conditional, and in uences of information policies on revenues of the auctions are related to both numbers of bidders and locations of items.

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Section: Equilibrium and Winnersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A class Hotelling model for sequential auctions of close substitutes

Rao

Zhao

2018

Scientia Iranica

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“…Our single-unit theoretical model in Section 2 also embodies an assumption that there are no other auctions, either simultaneously or in the future. This is often assumed in the auction literature (with some notable exceptions, e.g., Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Zeithammer (2006Zeithammer ( , 2007Zeithammer ( , 2010, Nekipelov (2008), Zeithammer and Adams (2010), and Backus and Lewis (2016)), but it may be questionable for some product categories on eBay and similar markets.…”

Section: Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions

Ackerberg

Hirano

Shahriar

2017

Quantitative Economics

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Buy price auctions merge a posted price option with a standard bidding mechanisms, and have been used by various online auction sites including eBay and General Motors Assistance Corporation. A buyer in a buy price auction can accept the buy price to win with certainty and end the auction early. Intuitively, the buy price option may appeal to bidders who are risk averse or impatient to obtain the good, and a number of authors have examined how such mechanisms can increase the seller's expected revenue over standard auctions. We show that data from buy price auctions can be used to identify bidders' risk aversion and time preferences. We develop a private value model of bidder behavior in a buy price auction with a temporary buy price. Bidders arrive stochastically over time, and the auction proceeds as a second‐price sealed bid auction after the buy price disappears. Upon arrival, a bidder in our model is allowed to act immediately (i.e., accept the buy price if it is still available or place a bid) or wait and act later. Allowing for general forms of risk aversion and impatience, we first characterize equilibria in cutoff strategies and describe conditions under which all symmetric pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria are in cutoff strategies. Given sufficient exogenous variation in auction characteristics such as reserve and buy prices and in auction lengths, we then show that the arrival rate, valuation distribution, utility function, and time‐discounting function in our model are all nonparametrically identified. We also develop extensions of the identification results for cases where the variation in auction characteristics is more limited.

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“…Recently, Robert Zeithammer [15] discussed a sequential auctions with two goods combined with eBay, and analyzed the information disclosure or hidden for the second goods impact on the auction efficiency, and proved the existence of a symmetric equilibrium and pure strategy. It is an extension for the related work of Milgrom and Weber, but it is still regarded as the symmetrical buyer.…”

Section: Mechanism Improvement and Signaling Optimization Of Multi-ob...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Applications of the Network and Computer Technology in the Model Optimization of Multi-Object E-Auctions

Rao

Dong

2014

AMM

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With the development of computer technology and network, e-Auctions are widely applied in the field of engineering technology. How to use the computer technology and network to optimize the models of multi-object e-auctions is a hot topic. Regarding the e-auction as a background, this paper presents many widespread theoretical and applied problems, and summarizes and reviews the main conclusions and progress of existing studies related to the computer technology and network in the e-auctions, and then gives several new research topics to e-auctions. It tries to promote the applications of e-auction theories in real engineering technology problems.

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Sequential Auctions with Information About Future Goods

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

A class Hotelling model for sequential auctions of close substitutes

A class Hotelling model for sequential auctions of close substitutes

Identification of time and risk preferences in buy price auctions

Applications of the Network and Computer Technology in the Model Optimization of Multi-Object E-Auctions

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