Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

Bonein, Aurélie; Turolla, Stéphane

doi:10.1016/j.rie.2009.07.003

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…For instance, Meagher and Zauner () introduce uncertainty over consumer tastes or locations to study the firms' location decisions about horizontal product differentiation and then identify demand uncertainty as a differentiation force. On the basis of these findings, Bonein and Turolla () introduce a one‐sided demand uncertainty and extend the discussion into a sequential case. They find that demand uncertainty is a differentiation (agglomeration) force when the first (second) entrant faces demand uncertainty.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality investment timing by the startup and the established firm

2017

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This study investigates quality investment timing decisions of the established firm and the startup by a duopoly model, where firms can position quality early (demand uncertainty is high) or late (uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at different costs. The startup positions quality to maximize its survival probability, whereas the established firm maximizes profits. Results indicate that the startup positions quality earlier than the established firm when the demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline sharply over time. Additionally, policy analysis shows that subsidies work better than direct funds in encouraging quality innovation of the startup.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality investment timing by the startup and the established firm

2017

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“…This assumption allows us to focus on the information sharing and product positioning conundrums. 6 Making price decisions after the uncertainty regarding consumer preferences is resolved is in line with most of the literature involving uncertain taste (e.g., Biyalogorsky and Koenigsberg 2010, Bonein and Turolla 2009. Furthermore, this setup allows us to focus on the impact of information on the product positioning decisions in the context of consumer taste uncertainty.…”

Section: Retailer Acquires Informationmentioning

confidence: 77%

Brand positioning and consumer taste information

Nalça

Boyacı

Ray

2018

European Journal of Operational Research

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In this paper, we study how a retailer can benefit from acquiring consumer taste information in the presence of competition between the retailers store brand (SB) and a manufacturers national brand (NB). In our model, there is ex-ante uncertainty about consumer preferences for distinct product features, and the retailer has an advantage in resolving this uncertainty because of his close proximity to consumers. Our focus is on the impact of the retailers information acquisition and disclosure strategy on the positioning of the brands. Our analysis reveals that acquiring taste information allows the retailer to make better SB positioning decisions.Information disclosure, however, enables the manufacturer to make better NB positioning decisions -which in return may benefit or hurt the retailer. For instance, if a particular product feature is quite popular, then it is beneficial for the retailer to incorporate that feature into the SB, and inform the manufacturer so that the NB also includes this feature. Information sharing, in these circumstances, benefits both the retailer and the manufacturer, even though it increases the intensity of competition between the brands. But, there are situations in which the retailer refrains from information sharing so that a potentially poor positioning decision by the NB makes the SB the only provider of the popular feature. The retailer always benefits from acquiring information. However, it is beneficial to the manufacturer only if the retailer does not introduce an SB due to the associated high fixed cost.

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“…Although established for a given set of assumptions, the differentiation force entailed by demand uncertainty remains valid under alternative assumptions: a non‐uniform distribution of the random shock (Meagher & Zauner, 2004, 2008, 2011), sequential location choices (Bonein & Turolla, 2009; Casado‐Izaga, 2000; Harter, 1996), and pricing decisions under demand uncertainty (Meagher & Zauner, 2004, 2005). 16…”

Section: A Discrete Version Of the Hotelling Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment

Bonein

Turolla

2023

Economics Manag Strategy

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Working Papers SMART-LERECO ont pour vocation de diffuser les recherches conduites au sein des unités SMART et LERECO dans une forme préliminaire permettant la discussion et avant publication définitive. Selon les cas, il s'agit de travaux qui ont été acceptés ou ont déjà fait l'objet d'une présentation lors d'une conférence scientifique nationale ou internationale, qui ont été soumis pour publication dans une revue académique à comité de lecture, ou encore qui constituent un chapitre d'ouvrage académique. Bien que non revus par les pairs, chaque working paper a fait l'objet d'une relecture interne par un des scientifiques de SMART ou du LERECO et par l'un des deux éditeurs de la série. Les Working Papers SMART-LERECO n'engagent cependant que leurs auteurs.

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Sequential location under one-sided demand uncertainty

Cited by 12 publications

References 34 publications

Quality investment timing by the startup and the established firm

Quality investment timing by the startup and the established firm

Brand positioning and consumer taste information

Spatial competition with demand uncertainty: A laboratory experiment

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