Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications

Dur, Umut; Kesten, Onur

doi:10.1007/s00199-018-1133-9

Cited by 28 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…We point out that all the results shown in this paper also hold under the modified Boston mechanism, proposed by Dur (2015). The first round of the modified Boston mechanism and of the (standard) Boston mechanism are identical, but for any subsequent round we instead have:…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 56%

“…As such, there is no scope for strategic behavior on the part of the schools in their paper. Dur (2015) considers the modified Boston mechanism which also involves students never applying to schools that were filled in a previous round. Unlike Mennle and Seuken (2014) he allows for schools' priorities to be exogenously given, rather than randomly generated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The author also does not consider a strategic role for the schools. Dur (2015) shows that the modified Boston mechanism is less manipulable than the Boston mechanism in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (2013) and that the set of Nash equilibria induced by the (complete information) preference revelation game equals the set of stable matchings under the true preferences. Pais and Pintér (2008) experimentally compare the performance of the Boston, DA, and TTC mechanisms in terms of efficiency and manipulability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó

Heller

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. (2006) results which show that for schools it is a dominant strategy to truthfully rank the students under the Boston mechanism, and that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies of the induced game are stable, rely crucially on two assumptions. First, (a) that schools need to be restricted to find all students acceptable, and (b) that students cannot observe the priorities set by the schools before submitting their preferences. We show that relaxing either assumption eliminates the strategy dominance, and that Nash equilibrium outcomes in undominated strategies for the simultaneous induced game in case (a) and subgame perfect Nash equilibria in case (b) may contain unstable matchings. We also show that when able to manipulate capacities, schools may only have an incentive to do so if students submit their preferences after observing the reported capacities. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 56%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Bó

Heller

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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“…The proportion of disadvantaged families is about 10% (PTVRR, 2015) and children with special needs make up about 3% (Paat et al, 2011). This question is similar to the question of the design of two-stage allocation mechanisms (Dur & Kesten, 2014) and also to the design of appeal processes (Dur & Kesten, 2015). The first option is to allocate the extra places exclusively among the unmatched children.…”

Section: Further Issuesmentioning

confidence: 91%

Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design

Veski¹,

Bíró²,

Põder³

et al. 2017

jMID

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We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality, Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We evaluate seven policy designs based on 2016 admission data in order to understand efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the descriptive data analysis, we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity analysis using computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we vary how the priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors. Different lotteries are included for breaking ties. We find that different ways of considering the same priority factors can have a significant aggregate effect on the allocation. Additionally, we survey a dozen special features that can create significant challenges (both theoretical and practical) in redesigning the

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“…Because my analysis is about a one-to-one matching market, the analysis in this paper has nothing in principle to say about the behavior of schools. 16 See, for instance, Westkamp (2013); Dur and Kesten (2014); Feigenbaum et al (2017); Dogan and Yenmez (2018); Haeringer and Iehlé (2019); Andersson et al (2018); Mai and Vazirani (2019). Except for the last two papers, this literature studies models that are in a sense static: the agents and their matching opportunities are fixed.…”

Section: T3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamically Stable Matching

Doval

2019

SSRN Journal

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I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents' outcomes are. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match.

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Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications

Cited by 28 publications

References 24 publications

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited

Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design

Dynamically Stable Matching

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