Sequential Vote Buying

Chen, Ying; Zápal, Jan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3612957

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Instead, we allow members to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Cheap capture also occurs in Genicot and Ray (2006) and Chen and Zápal (2020) where the vote buyer approaches members sequentially and exploits the timing of offers. On the contrary, the vote buyer makes all offers at the same time in our model, both in simultaneous and sequential voting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Norman (2002) characterizes the nonsymmetric equilibria of the classical model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and shows that some proposals can be unanimously approved. Chen andEraslan (2013, 2014) look at the other side of the problem and study a vote-selling model where members with uncertain preferences send messages to the vote buyer to influence the proposal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences

Louis-Sidois,

Musolff

2024

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We analyze a vote‐buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately‐drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the disutility distribution and all members are bribed with sufficient dispersion. A proportional increase in the number of members and the vote threshold leads to a less‐than‐proportional increase in capture cost, and the cost may increase with the vote threshold. With sequential voting and disutility distribution U[0,1], all members are bribed and bribes are equal. Finally, sequential voting increases capture cost in small committees and decreases it in large committees.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%