Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations

Koster, Maurice; Tijs, S.H.; Borm, Peter

doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00040-7

Cited by 26 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Consider, Without loss of generality q 1 q 2 :::: q n . De…ne, q i = (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q i 1 ; q i ; q i ; :::; q i ) then , 1 3 q max can be 1 1 4 In some of the more general models e.g., [17], [15], each agent may demand quantities of some or all of the goods. 1 5 An special case which is widely studied in this framework is the preference which is quasilinear in x i and concave in q i :…”

Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, a natural question is what the counterpart of the serial method in heterogeneous good (multidimensional) case will be. Among the various approaches to extend the Serial Mechanism to the case of heterogeneous goods, it is a general consensus ( Koplin [15], Koster et al [17], Sprumont [28], Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin [9] etc.) that the mechanism must coincide with the Serial Mechanism in the homogeneous case.…”

Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, knowing that we can not be too demanding with respect to serial extension there have been di¤erent approaches to pin down the class of methods which carry on the properties of serial method for homogeneous methods to the heterogeneous goods environment. These approaches can be broadly categorized into two groups-one which focusses on axiomatic approach ( Koster et al [17], Sprumont [28]) and the other which is concerned about the strategic properties ( Friedman [7], Friedman and Moulin [9], Friedman [8]). …”

Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure implementation in production economies

Kumar

2013

Mathematical Social Sciences

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One thing that has been assumed for a long time is that whenever there is dominant strategy equilibrium in the game form of any mechanism and the outcome corresponding to that strategy pro…le is socially optimal, people will play that particular equilibrium strategy pro…le. The theory has been silent on why they will play that particular strategy pro…le when there are other (Nash) equilibria. The Nash/Bayes'Nash implementation being a possible solution to this problem su¤ers from the drawback of either the requirement of the designer knowing the (common) prior (in case of Bayes' Nash implementation) or the requirement of the players predicting the actions of other players and collaborate without pre-talk (in case of Nash implementation with absence of dominant strategy or unique Nash).Secure implementation [Saijo et al. (2007)] is a relatively new concept in the theory of mechanism design and implementation. This requires double implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium by the same Mechanism. This concept has worked well in some particular environments and has been tested on data [Cason et al. (2006)]. Unsurprisingly, being stronger than both the two above said concepts of implementation, there are many impossibility results in speci…c environments with richer domains. We look for secure implementability in production economies with divisible goods. We …nd that a very broad generalization of "Serial" Social Choice Function (SCF) [Moulin and Shenker (92)] as de…ned in [Shenker (92)] is securely implementable. We call such functions as Generalized Serial SCF (GSS). We also …nd that under certain conditions the Fixed Path SCFs are special cases of GSS and thus they are also securely Implementable. We conjecture that these are the

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Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Serial Cost Sharing Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure implementation in production economies

Kumar

2013

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…The Additivity assumption is nearly universal in the study of Cost Sharing mechanisms (with the notable exceptions of [9,10,11]). It has several justifications ranging from decentralization to immunity to some accounting issues.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms

Friedman

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms.

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“…Inter alia we can mention the decreasing serial mechanism defined by de Frutos (1998), the mixed cost sharing introduced by Hougaard and Thorlund-Petersen (2001), and the concave serial rule and the convex serial rule introduced by Koster (2002). There are also generalizations of the serial cost sharing rule to heterogeneous cost sharing models (Koster, 2006(Koster, , 2007 and when agents require bundle of goods (Koster et al, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%