SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

Nikiforakis, Nick; Meert, Wannes; Younan, Yves; Johns, Martin; Joosen, Wouter

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19125-1_7

Cited by 59 publications

(68 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…This policy gives similar guarantees as fine-grained cookie access control systems, such as SessionShield [44], that use heuristic techniques to prevent access to session cookies but allow access to other cookies.…”

Section: Can Flowfox Enforce Useful Policies?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scripts can leak session identifiers [44], inject requests into an ongoing session [9], sniff the user's browsing history, or track the user's behavior on a web site [29]. Such malicious scripts can enter a web page because of a cross-site scripting vulnerability [31], or because the page integrates third party scripts such as advertisements, or gadgets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice

Groef

Devriese

Nikiforakis

et al. 2014

JCS

Self Cite

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Secure Multi-Execution (SME) is a precise and general information flow control mechanism that was claimed to be a good fit for implementing information flow security in browsers. We validate this claim by developing FlowFox, the first fully functional web browser that implements an information flow control mechanism for web scripts based on the technique of secure multi-execution. We provide evidence for the security of FlowFox by proving non-interference for a formal model of the essence of FlowFox, and by showing how it stops real attacks. We provide evidence of usefulness by showing how FlowFox subsumes many ad-hoc script-containment countermeasures developed over the last years. An experimental evaluation on the Alexa top-500 web sites provides evidence for compatibility, and shows that FlowFox is compatible with the current web, even on sites that make intricate use of JavaScript.The performance and memory cost of FlowFox is substantial (a performance cost of around 20% on macro benchmarks for a simple two-level policy), but not prohibitive. Our prototype implementation shows that information flow enforcement based on secure multi-execution can be implemented in full-scale browsers. It can support powerful, yet compatible policies refining the same-origin-policy in a way that is compatible with existing websites.

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Section: Can Flowfox Enforce Useful Policies?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice

Groef

Devriese

Nikiforakis

et al. 2014

JCS

Self Cite

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“…DEMACRO utilizes a techniques initially described by Nikiforakis et al [16] and Tang et al [23] that attempts to identify session identifiers at the client-side. The approach consists of two pillars.…”

Section: Plug-in Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This session identifier technique works without the assistance of Web servers and offers excellent detection capabilities with a false negatives rate of~3% and a false-positive ratio of~0.8% [16].…”

Section: Plug-in Identificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kirda et al [12] attempt to stop session hijacking attacks conducted through cross-site scripting (XSS) [26] at the client side using a proxy which blocks requests towards dynamically generated URIs leading to third-party domains. Nikiforakis et al [16] and Tang et al [23] tackle the same problem through the identification of session identifiers at the client-side and their subsequent separation from the scripts running in the browser. Vogt et al [24] also attempt to prevent the leakage of session identifiers through the use of static analysis and dynamic data tainting, however Russo et al [20] have shown that the identifiers can still be leaked through the use of side channels.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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DEMACRO: Defense against Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

Lekies

Nikiforakis

Tighzert

et al. 2012

Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses

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Abstract. In the constant evolution of the Web, the simple always gives way to the more complex. Static webpages with click-through dialogues are becoming more and more obsolete and in their place, asynchronous JavaScript requests, Web mash-ups and proprietary plug-ins with the ability to conduct cross-domain requests shape the modern user experience. Three recent studies showed that a significant number of Web applications implement poor cross-domain policies allowing malicious domains to embed Flash and Silverlight applets which can conduct arbitrary requests to these Web applications under the identity of the visiting user. In this paper, we confirm the findings of the aforementioned studies and we design DEMACRO, a client-side defense mechanism which detects potentially malicious cross-domain requests and de-authenticates them by removing existing session credentials. Our system requires no training or user interaction and imposes minimal performance overhead on the user's browser.

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CookieArmor: Safeguarding against cross‐site request forgery and session hijacking

Sinha

Tripathy

2019

Security and Privacy

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Internet browsers use cookies and session‐IDs for maintaining HTTP state information which has led to several security vulnerabilities such as cross‐site request forgery (CSRF) and session hijacking. Several works have been carried out in the past to address these threats and most of these works propose an additional layer between the client‐server communication architecture. While some solutions propose this layer at the client side, others propose it at the server side. This work proposes an efficient client‐side proxy named CookieArmor for addressing the threat of CSRF and cross‐site scripting (XSS). CookieArmor is a two‐token selective CSRF prevention mechanism with restricted relaxation for cross‐origin request. CookieArmor determines whether a script is capable of performing state changing operations and safeguards only such scripts using a two‐token CSRF prevention scheme. CookieArmor uses active Session‐ID filtering to safeguards against session hijacking. CookieArmor also uses quotient‐filter between the proxy and its internal database for improving the performance. Efficiency of CookieArmor demonstrates significant improvement than other solutions.

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SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

Cited by 59 publications

References 18 publications

Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice

Secure multi-execution of web scripts: Theory and practice

DEMACRO: Defense against Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

CookieArmor: Safeguarding against cross‐site request forgery and session hijacking

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