and XX 19XX, on the two sort of commons). Many of our current ecological dilemmas have the properties of commons. Among traditional societies, commons problems are also common (e.g. see Hawkes 1992).Thus it's of particular interest when we can identify commons that are managed, despite the temptations of individually rational, group-destructive behavior, in a way that is far-sighted and conserving. There are strong suggestions from laboratory gaming experiments that repeated interactions are important in fostering the necessary trust and cooperativeness (e.g. Walker XX 19XX). Did peoples in traditional society cooperate to a greater extent than we do today? Were there conscribed areas (e.g. natal family) of cooperation?My purpose here is to step back from complex situations, and examine these problems in traditional societies: [1] whether evidence of environmental degradation exists in traditional societies; [2] when (under what ecological conditions) a strong conservation ethic is evidenced in traditional societies; and whether it bears any relationship to degradation; and [3] under what conditions societies attempt to foster the characteristics (e.g. trust) that facilitate cooperation. I seek commonalties which perhaps can then be used in teasing apart more complex examples.
A Behavioral Ecological ApproachDespite all our cultural complexity, we humans must solve the same ecological problems as all other organisms in order to survive and reproduce. And, however complex the interaction between our genes and the external environment, when family lineages die out, they are replaced by other, competing, lineages. Thus, behavioral ecologists often calculate an unfamiliar sort of self-interest: genetic self interest. Further, despite a certain amount of polemic (e.g., Lewontin et al. 1984), the evidence is accumulating that it is appropriate to apply to humans, at least for the purposes of generating hypotheses, the central paradigm in biology: that humans, like other living organisms, have evolved to maximize their genetic contribution to future generations through producing offspring and assisting non-descendant relatives; that the particular strategies accomplishing such maximization will differ in specifiable ways in different environments; and, just as for other mammals, these strategies will typically differ between the sexes. Humans can, through their extensive elaboration of devices like nepotism and reciprocity, respond in complex and subtle ways; this does not mean that selection is absent.In the behavioral ecological literature (e.g. see Cronk 1991, Krebs and Davies 1992), two things stand out: [1] genetically selfish behaviors, those which enhance an individuals' genetic representation (through direct reproduction or assistance of relatives), are always favored; and [2] fertility responds to the richness, controllability and predictability of important resources, and to the sources of juvenile mortality. All living things have evolved to acquire and use resources to Low